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This thesis examines the role of Brazil's military in
counter-drug operations. Drug trafficking in Brazil poses a
growing threat to the country's national security, but
Brazil's physical size and limited resources have hindered
the government's counter-drug efforts. The Brazilian
military has been reluctant to assume a more significant
role in counter-drug operations. The thesis argues that
external, internal, and institutional pressures are driving
the Brazilian military to expand its counter-drug role. The
thesis recommends that the Brazilian military expand its
current support role in counter-drug operations, but that it
avoid a direct role in law enforcement operations. The
United States should support this expanded role, but only to
the extent that such a role does not threaten the further
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. THE DILEMMA AND THE THESIS
Since the late 1980s, drug trafficking in Brazil has
become a serious problem. The country is a major
transhipment route for drugs destined for Europe and the
United States and is gradually becoming a large market for
illicit drugs. Brazil is also an important producer of
ether and acetone (used in the production of cocaine HC1)
,
as well as a transit route for chemicals from the United
States and Europe that are illegally diverted to Bolivia and
Colombia. Additionally, drug-related violence and
corruption is becoming more evident in Brazil's cities.
Brazilian officials are aware of the increasing problem.
However, the country's physical size and limited resources
have hindered the government's counter-drug efforts. For
example, the Departmento de Policia Federal (DPF) , a force
of 7,000 personnel, has been tasked with taking the lead
role in Brazil's counter-drug effort. This role consists of
patrolling 9,000 miles of borders with Colombia, Peru and
Bolivia, the three primary cocaine producing countries in
the region. The DPF is also responsible for attacking the
drug trade in Brazil's cities and for interdicting drug
shipments through the country. DPF officials readily admit
1
that they are undermanned and ill-equipped to make real
progress in defeating the drug traffickers.
Brazil's armed forces consist of approximately 270,000
personnel. These forces have significant capabilities
including fixed and rotary wing aircraft; maritime
surveillance assets; a sophisticated command and control,
and intelligence network; and the infrastructure to
adequately support forces deployed to the field. These
capabilities indicate that the Brazilian military could
considerably enhance the country's counter-drug efforts,
particularly the work of the DPF. However, the Brazilian
military has been reluctant to assume a significant role in
the country's counter-drug strategy.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of
Brazil's armed forces in counter-drug operations.
Specifically, it analyzes the military's reluctance to
assume a counter-drug mission, despite a number of reasons
that indicate the military could benefit from greater
participation in counter-drug operations.
With the end of the cold war and the decline of military
governments in Latin America, external threats to Brazil
have all but disappeared. Consequently, without a well
defined external threat and faced with fiscal constraints,
"Drug Trade Flourishing in Northern Brazil," The
Washington Post . 13 August 1991.
Brazilians are questioning the rationale for maintaining and
modernizing a military that no longer has a significant
role. Concurrently, as the drug problem worsens in Brazil,
the government of Brazil (GOB) is increasing its efforts to
counter the problem. These efforts include designating more
financial resources to the problem and elevating the issue
to the level of national importance.
In examining the Brazilian drug problem and the future
role of the military in Brazil, it is apparent that the
Brazilian military, for purposes of both national security
and preservation of their institution, could become more
involved in Brazilian counter-drug efforts. However, as
previously mentioned, the Brazilian military has refused to
play a larger role in counter-drug operations. The
explanation for this is the major research question to be
solved.
My thesis is that external, internal and institutional
pressures are driving the Brazilian military to expand its
counter-drug role . External pressure is represented by the
United States and its international counter-drug policy.
Internal is defined as occurring from within Brazil, such as
the government providing encouragement for greater military
participation in counter-drug operations, as the drug
problem gradually becomes a national security problem.
Institutional refers to events occurring within the
3
Brazilian military. For example, faced with fiscal
constraints and no viable threat, the military's leadership
may be pressured from within to accept the counter-drug role
in order to preserve the military institution.
External pressure is a necessary, but insufficient
condition, for the expansion of the military's counter-drug
role. However, it can influence both internal and
institutional pressures.
B. THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS, MAJOR RESEARCH
QUESTIONS & METHODOLOGY
In order to present a comprehensive discussion of the
relationship between Brazil's drug problem and the role of
the armed forces in the country's counter-drug strategy, a
number of questions need to be addressed. First, why is
this thesis relevant to a military officer and student of
Latin American affairs? Brazil's growing drug problem is
not only a threat to Brazilian society, but the country's
increasing role as a production and transhipment route for
drugs destined for the United States represents a threat to
U.S. national security. Additionally, since 1982, due to
the level of sophistication in the drug trafficking
organizations, the United States recognized that military
National Security Strategy of the United States . The White
House, August 1991, 17. This strategy states that the
international trade in drugs is a major threat to U.S. national
security.
involvement was necessary to conduct effective counter-drug
operations in the United States. Following this
rationale for involving the U.S. military in counter-drug
operations, the United States' counter-drug strategy in
South America encourages Latin American countries to
actively engage their armed forces in narcotics control.
Consequently, the Brazilian reluctance to become more
involved in counter-drug operations needs to be better
understood by U.S. policy makers in order to make the U.S.
counter-drug strategy in Brazil more effective. For the
Latin Americanist, analyzing and understanding the Brazilian
military's reluctance to assume a greater role in counter-
drug operations provides an insight into the identity crisis
that is plaguing the majority of Latin American militaries
in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, the study provides a
perspective on the future role of the military in Brazilian
society and another case study on the positive and negative
aspects of involving South American militaries in counter-
drug operations.
Committee on Government Operations, Military Assistance to
Civilian Narcotics Law Enforcement: An Interim Report , Union
Calendar No. 576, House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 28
September 1982, p. 1-3.
4 Melvyn Levitsky, The Andean Strategy to Control Cocaine ,
United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Current Policy No. 1287, Washington, DC, 1990.
Second, it is important to analyze the scope of the drug
problem in Brazil and determine whether the severity of the
problem warrants the use of Brazil's armed forces in a
counter-drug strategy. The literature and case studies
providing the paradigm to conduct this analysis are limited
to similar initiatives in the Andean nations (Bolivia,
Colombia and Peru) and the United States. In these countries
drug trafficking was considered a threat to national
security and the armed forces were incorporated into
counter-drug operations. Therefore, generalizations from
these cases can be utilized in analyzing the Brazilian case.
Third, and related to the previous question, is
identifying what internal, institutional and other pressures
are pressing the Brazilian military to assume a larger role
in counter-drug operations. Utilizing the key words
"Brazil", "drugs" and "military", a search of Brazilian and
American periodicals was conducted. Additionally a number
of U.S. government officials were interviewed and queried as
to what entities were exerting pressure on the Brazilian
military to become more involved in counter-drug operations.
It was discovered that initially, external pressure from the
United States was the primary source of pressure for
Brazilian military involvement in counter-drug operations.
More recently (1991-1992), the emphasis for a change in the
military's position on the issue is essentially coming from
the Brazilian government and from the military itself.
Fourth, the study examines the Brazilian military.
Specifically, it focuses on whether the counter-drug mission
is a legitimate role for the Brazilian armed forces. It
analyzes competing arguments for more extensive use of the
Brazilian military in counter-drug operations in the context
of three major issues:
• The severity of the Brazilian drug problem.
• Brazilian civil-military relations.
• The importance of the Brazilian military as an
institution.
Analyzing the arguments in this manner is not only
important for understanding the Brazilian perspective on the
issue, but is also necessary for formulating a U.S. policy
that appreciates the sensitivities involved in the Brazilian
military assuming a larger role in counter-drug operations.
Finally, the study examines potential roles for the
Brazilian military in counter-drug operations. The
examination reflects the domestic political concerns of
Brazil and the foreign policy concerns of the United States.
The conclusion of this thesis will examine the answers
to these questions and demonstrate how they support the
primary prediction of this thesis: that external, internal
and institutional pressures are driving the Brazilian
military to expand its counter-drug role.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The thesis is broken down into an Introduction,
Conclusion, and three distinct parts. The first part
(Sections II and III) provides an overview of the drug
problem in Brazil and an examination of how the government's
drug policies have changed with the increasing severity of
the drug problem. Section II reviews and defines the drug
problem in Brazil and discusses possible future trends for
the Brazilian drug problem. Section III examines Brazilian
responses to the drug problem by analyzing specific
Brazilian counter-drug initiatives. The section concludes
by presenting a discussion on whether current Brazilian
initiatives are sufficient to at least slow down the
country's expanding drug problem.
The second part (Sections IV and V) examines external,
internal and institutional pressures for a greater Brazilian
military role in counter-drug activities. Section IV
analyzes indirect and direct pressures applied by the United
States and highlights the sources of pressure from within
Brazilian political society. Section V provides a
comprehensive examination of the Brazilian military and the
drug problem. It focuses on the major issues and arguments
8
that are driving the military's institutional debate over
assuming a larger role in counter-drug operations.
The third part (Sections VI and VII) defines a number of
options for the Brazilian military and the United States for
implementing an effective counter-drug strategy in Brazil.
Section VI outlines potential missions for a Brazilian
military that assumes a more significant role in counter-
drug efforts, and briefly examines other Brazilian counter-
drug initiatives that could complement these potential
missions. Section VII focuses on what role the United States
should play in assisting Brazil in developing an effective
counter-drug strategy. This includes if and how the United
States should encourage and assist in defining a greater
role for the Brazilian military in counter-drug operations.
The conclusion summarizes the findings and provides
recommendations for further research.
D. SOURCES
Although literature on the Brazilian military and its
role in Brazilian society is quite abundant, there is a lack
of published material on the Brazilian drug problem and the
role of the Brazilian military in countering that problem.
This shortfall is attributed to the fact that until recently
(1987-1992) the problem did not exist or was ignored.
Despite the lack of material providing a comprehensive
analysis of the problem, there exists a large amount of
information concerning more specific aspects of the problem.
Consequently, the primary sources for this study were
articles from periodicals published between 1986 and March
1992. The study relies heavily on Brazilian articles and
broadcasts translated and published in the Latin America:
Foreign Broadcast Information Service . A number of
Brazilian journals and periodicals that were not translated
were also utilized. During April of 1992 the author
travelled to Washington, D.C. and interviewed a number of
government officials. Agencies visited included the United
States Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
and various offices within the Department of Defense.
10
II. REVIEWING & DEFINING THE DRUG PROBLEM IN BRAZIL
A. DEFINING THE BRAZILIAN DRUG PROBLEM
The following excerpt from the 1992 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) provides a general
assessment of the Brazilian drug problem:
Brazil is a significant transhipment country for Bolivian,
Peruvian and Colombian cocaine destined for the U.S. and
Europe. It is also an important producer of ether and
acetone, which can be diverted from legitimate commerce
for the production of cocaine Hcl, as well as a transit
route for chemicals from the U.S. and Europe illegally
diverted to Bolivia and to a lesser extent Colombia.
The INCSR assessment indicates the Brazilian drug problem is
primarily attributed to the country's function as a supplier
in the international drug trade. Therefore, examining the
scope of Brazil's function as a "supplier country" is
necessary.
Until 1989 Brazilian officials recognized the drug
problem in the neighboring countries of Bolivia, Colombia
and Peru, but generally dismissed the fact that Brazil was
experiencing a drug problem of any significance. This
complacency was most likely attributed to a number of
factors. For example, Brazil's vast Amazon jungle region




drug producing neighbors and Brazil's eastern cities.
Additionally, Brazil has a number of other national problems
such as the highest foreign debt in the developing world,
and a severely depressed economy.
In 1989, Brazilian officials began to recognize the drug
problem. That year, Brazilian Federal Police (DPF)
discovered an increasing number of cocaine processing
laboratories and made more cocaine seizures. In November
1989, the Federal Police in Sao Paulo a uncovered new
shipping route used by Colombia's Medellin Cartel, the most
powerful drug trafficking organization in the world. The
DPF reported that the cartel leaders had organized a new
route through Brazil to distribute cocaine in the markets of
the United States and Europe. According to the Sao Paulo
Federal Narcotics Department Police Chief, strong repression
efforts against drug traffickers in Colombia had forced them
In 1987 the Brazilian government clearly recognized the
drug trafficking threat along its border, but anti-drug efforts
were limited to border sealing operations and the problem was not
considered significant. See "Military to Strengthen Border
Against Traffickers," Madrid EFE . in Spanish, 30 March 1987,
translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Latin
America (FBIS) , 2 April 1987, 2-3; and "Police Increase Struggle
Against Drug Trafficking," Madrid EFE . in Spanish, 11 June 1987,
translated in FBIS . 24 June 1987, 2-3.
"Region: External Debt Update," Latin American Regional
Report . September 1991.
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to find new routes and methods of trafficking cocaine to the
United States and Europe. 8
In January of 1991 it was reported that Brazil had
become a paradise for drug traffickers from Colombia, Peru
and Bolivia, who have established a modern transport,
storage, distribution and export network in Brazil.
According to Sergio Sakon, head of the planning department
of the Federal Police's anti-drug division, this illegal
network is ideally supported by Brazil's industrial parks,
hotels, road and air links with neighboring countries,
seaports, airports and a sophisticated black market. 9
Published statistics on drug seizures indicate that
Brazil has become the second-largest exporter of cocaine in
the world. 10 The map of the Brazilian drug trade is as
follows:
The main entry points for cocaine — some 90 percent comes
from Colombia and Bolivia — are small border towns in the
states of Acre, Amazonas, Rondonia, Mato Grosso and Mato
Grosso do Sul. It is stored at remote farms in Mato
Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul before being transported to
the main cities, principally Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro,
8
"Police Uncover 'New' Medellin Cartel Drug Route,"
Brasilia Radio Nacional de Amazonia , in Portuguese, 29 November
1989, translated in FBIS, 30 November 1989, 44-45.
9
"Brazil a 'Paradise' for Drug Traffickers," Latin American
Regional Reports: Brazil . 10 January 1991, 3. The article relies
extensively on reports from the Brazilian newspapers Jornal do
Brasil and Folha de Sao Paulo.
10 Ibid.
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for distribution to other parts of Brazil or shipment to
the US and Europe.
By 1991, Brazil had clearly become a major transhipment
route for cocaine destined for the United States.
There has also been some concern in Brazil over certain
regions in the Amazon becoming centers for coca cultivation.
This concern is primarily based on fact that a lower quality
coca leaf — epadu — can be grown easily in the Amazon
region. With tougher coca eradication and interdiction
programs in the Andean countries, it was feared that epadu
would become a viable alternative for the traditional and
higher quality Andean coca leaf. However, there is no
evidence of this occurring at any significant rate.
What is the effect on Brazilian society of Brazil's role
as a transhipment route for cocaine? Evidence indicates
that there has been a growth in consumer demand for drugs in
Brazil. In July of 1990, a Sao Paulo newspaper stated that
drug consumption had increased in the Sao Paulo state and
that a major drug organization distributing a "crack"
Ibid.
"Amazon Indians Grow Coca for Drug Traffickers," Veia . in
Portuguese, 17 August 1988, translated in FBIS, 18 August 1988,
34.
The NNICC Report . United States Drug Enforcement Agency,
1991, 11, and the INCSR, United States Department of State, 1992.
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derivative to the local population had been discovered.
Throughout 1990, Brazilian federal, state and local police
began targeting drug organizations operating and
distributing cocaine in Brazil's major cities.
These reports of a growing Brazilian drug abuse problem
were confirmed by a number of private studies that concluded
that Brazil has a growing marijuana problem and increasing
levels of cocaine abuse among the middle and upper class.
In mid-1990 President Fernando Collor de Mello directed the
Ministry of Education to develop drug awareness programs for
inclusion in the curriculum of Brazilian public schools.
Consequently, by the end of 1990, it was quite apparent that
Brazil's drug problem, as a "supplier country," had
escalated. The drug traffickers were now using Brazil as a
conduit to Brazilian, as well as American and European,
consumer drug markets.
14 .
"Details of Drug Trafficking," Estado de Sao Paulo , in
Portuguese, 15 July 1990, translated in FBIS, 18 July 1990, 35.
"Rio de Janeiro Drug Trafficker Arrested," Rio de Janeiro
Globo Television , in Portuguese, 5 January 1990, translated in
FBIS . 5 January 1990, 57; "Increased Drug Production in Sao Paulo
State," Estado de Sao Paulo , in Portuguese, 6 May 1990,
translated in FBIS . 9 May 1990, 37; and "Rio Police Deliver Heavy
Blow to Drug Dealers," Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television , in
Portuguese, 23 May 1990, translated in FBIS . 25 May 1990, 16.




As Brazil's drug problem began to escalate the social
consequences of the drug trade appeared in Brazilian
society. Drug-related violence began appearing at the local,
state and federal levels. For example, in February of 1990
the Federal Police Department in Mato Grosso do Sul
confirmed that federal and highway policemen were involved
18in a cocaine traffickers ring. In Ponta Pora, a town in
the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, regarded by the Federal
Police as a trading post for all the Bolivian cocaine
destined for local consumption and for the largest Brazilian
urban centers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, ranchers,
businessmen and members of the civil, military and federal
. 19police have been implicated in drug trafficking.
In 1991, Brazil's burgeoning drug problem began
receiving national attention when a federal deputy (a member
of the lower house of Brazil's Congress) was implicated in
drug trafficking. The incident, which occurred in the state
of Rondonia, located in western Brazil adjacent to Bolivia,
triggered a congressional investigation that included a two
day trip by the committee to Rondonia. Among other things,
18
"Policemen Caught Trafficking in Mato Grosso," Rio de
Janeiro Rede Globo Television , in Portuguese, 19 February 1990,
translated in FBIS, 21 February 1990, 35.
19
"Border State Drug Trade, Corruption Detailed," O Globo ,
in Portuguese, 25 February 1990, translated in FBIS . 28 February
1990, 27-29.
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the investigation produced a list of 31 politicians,
magistrates, city mayors and businessmen allegedly involved
in drug trafficking.
Brazil's cities are being inundated with drug abuse and
the violence and corruption associated with the trade.
According to police, the city of Corumba, located on the
river Paraguay adjacent to Bolivia, has an incidence of
crime characteristic of a city three times its size.
. 21Seventy percent of these crimes are drug related.
Heavily armed drug gangs control the slums of Rio de Janeiro
and drug traffickers are raiding military armories in Sao
22Paulo.
In summary, by the end of 1991, Brazil's drug problem
was clearly growing. The immediate danger was the country's
function as a transhipment route for illegal drugs, but the
growth of the Brazilian consumer market was becoming a
primary concern for the government.
"Brazil's Drug War Extends to Its Congress," The
Christian Science Monitor . 10 September 1991,5; and "Becoming a
Major Route to Europe," Latin American Weekly Report , 5 December
1991, 5.
"Just Say Who: Brazilian Border Town Battles Cocaine
Trade and, Now, Drug Use," The Wall Street Journal . 18 October
1991, 4.
22 ...
"Drug Traffickers Raiding Armories," Estado de Sao
Paulo . 3 February 1992, 3.
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B. ASSESSING THE SEVERITY OF THE BRAZILIAN DRUG PROBLEM
The level of drug-related corruption and violence
occurring in Brazil is significantly less than the high
levels found in Colombia and Peru. However, drug-related
corruption and violence are definitely on the rise in
Brazil. United States government officials interviewed in
conducting this study estimated that Brazil would have a
23
severe drug problem by the end of the decade , and one
Brazilian DPF official speculated that in ten or twenty
. . 24years from now, Brazil could be another Colombia.
Brazil's drug problem is getting worse and it is
reaching a level of severity that could define it as a
national security problem. Waltraud Morales provides the
following definition of national security:
National security. .. first entails defense in its narrowest
concept — the protection of a nation's people from
physical attack; and second, the more extensive concept of
the protection of political and economic interests
considered essential to the fundamental values and the
vitality of the state.
United States Government Officials, interview by author,
Washington, D.C., 29 March - 3 April 1992.
24
"Just Say Who:...," The Wall Street Journal . 18 October
1991, 4.
25 Waltraud Morales, "The War on Drugs: A New U.S. National
Security Doctrine?," Third World Quarterly . July 1989, 165.
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The United States National Security Strategy defines the
international trade in drugs as a threat to U.S. national
security as follows:
No threat does more danger to our national values and
institutions, and the domestic violence generated by the
trade in drugs is all too familiar.
The Brazilian drug problem clearly fits these
definitions, but the Brazilian government has not yet
declared the drug issue a problem of national security.
This is due primarily to a number of other issues of
national importance. For example, Brazil is gripped by
serious economic problems that pose a threat to national
stability and limit the allocation of financial resources to
deal with other national issues. Brazil's monthly inflation
rate is approximately 25 percent (the annual rate for 1990
was 1,585 percent); foreign external debt is $120 billion;
economic growth, as measured by real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) was -4.6 percent in 1990, and unemployment in some of
27the major cities was as high as 13 percent. Clearly,
Brazil's economic woes represent Brazil's most serious
national problem.
In summary, Brazil's drug problem is getting worse and
that the country's economic problems are hampering the
National Security Strategy of the United States , 1991, 7
27 .Foreign Economic Trends - Brazil . American Embassy,
Brazil, 16 December 1991, 1-13.
19
government's ability to address the drug issue. Despite
these economic limitations, Brazil has responded to the drug
problem, and as the situation has worsened, Brazil has
increased its counter-drug efforts. However, the drug
problem in Brazil is growing exponentially and Brazilian
responses to the drug problem may be too little too late.
20
III. BRAZILIAN RESPONSES TO THE DRUG PROBLEM:
ARE THEY SUFFICIENT?
A. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF BRAZILIAN COUNTER-DRUG INITIATIVES
The Brazilian government's responses to the country's
drug problem have generally expanded as the drug problem
worsened. When Brazilian officials considered their
country's drug problem as something occurring on the distant
western Amazon frontier, along the country's borders with
Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, counter-drug initiatives were
limited to increasing military and federal police patrols in
the border areas. Additionally, agreements were made with
bordering countries to cooperate with each other against the
drug traffickers.
When it became apparent that Brazil's drug problem had
spread to the country's major cities and that it was growing
exponentially, Brazilian officials began proposing counter-
drug legislation, strengthening the federal police and
seeking funding for counter-drug programs from external
sources.
In summary, Brazilian counter-drug initiatives since
1985 have emphasized the following:
• The Federal Police.
• The Armed Forces.
Government legislation.
• International and regional cooperation.
21
This chapter will examine the impact of these counter-
drug initiatives both separately and as a comprehensive drug
strategy. It seeks to determine whether current Brazilian
counter-drug initiatives are sufficient to deal effectively
with the country's drug problem.
B. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL POLICE
The Departmento de Policia Federal (DPF) , a force of
287,000 personnel, has been tasked with taking the lead
role in Brazil's counter-drug effort. This role consists of
patrolling 9,000 miles of borders with Colombia, Peru and
Bolivia, and the thousands of miles of navigable rivers and
. . .29jungle that make up Brazil's vast Amazon region.
Additionally, the DPF is also responsible for attacking the
drug trade in Brazil's cities and for interdicting drug
shipments that are exported from the country.
The DPF is undermanned and ill equipped to patrol such a
vast area. If it concentrated primarily on counter-drug
operations, it would leave other criminal activities
unattended. For example, the federal police detachment in
Corumba has one detective and 19 men to patrol 200 miles of
28 Of these 7,000 personnel, approximately 600 are assigned
to the Narcotics Unit. INCSR: 1992 . 4.
29 Brazil's Amazon region represents approximately 42
percent of the country's territory and it is estimated that five
percent of the nation's population inhabit the area.
22
border with Bolivia. The federal police chief in Corumba
states his dilemma as follows:
The hard truth is that the federal police doesn't have the
structure to work in Corumba. I can't at the same time
dismantle refineries, be at the police station, patrol the
borders and bring down more than 100 bocas [retail outlets
selling cocaine] in Corumba.
The Amazon state of Rondonia, which shares a border with
Bolivia consisting of 860 miles of uncharted rain forest and
rivers, has 14 federal agents. These agents have no
aircraft or radios and in 1990 did not have enough money to
pay for gas, which immobilized the agents for six months.
According to a US government official, the lack of an air
surveillance network in western Brazil allows the
traffickers to fly over the area with impunity.
Additionally, the DPF is not adequately equipped with boats
32to effectively patrol Brazil's extensive river network.
Although the DPF is currently not sufficiently manned or
equipped to combat Brazil's drug problem, progress has been
made in improving their capabilities. In 1991, the
Brazilian government announced that it planned to hire
approximately 2,000 more federal police and the DPF received
"Just Say Who:...," The Wall Street Journal . 18 October
1991, 4.
"Drug Trade Flourishing in Northern Brazil," The
Washington Post . 13 August 1991, 10.
U.S. Government Official, interview by author,
Washington, DC, 30 March 1992.
23
funds from the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse to buy
airport x-ray units, police radios and jeeps.
Dr. Romeu Tuma, director of the federal police,
summarized the DPF's war on the drug traffickers as follows:
People arrested and drugs seized have doubled these past
two years, but there is a long way to go. To make real
progress, you need men not miracles.
C. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
Brazil currently maintains about 270,000 men in the
armed forces; 183,000 in the army, 46,000 in the navy and
45,000 in the air force. Capabilities and equipment of the
armed forces include:
Modern fixed and rotary wing aircraft for attack,
defense, surveillance and troop lift missions.
• Blue-water navy with a maritime defense and
surveillance mission and a limited brown water
capability.
• Conventional and unconventional land forces trained for
jungle and urban warfare.
• Sophisticated command and control and intelligence
capability.
• Logistics infrastructure able to adequately support
forces in the field.
The military's role in combatting Brazil's drug problem
has primarily consisted of border sealing operations,
INCSR. 1992 . 4, and "Brazil Wilderness is Drug Highway,"
The New York Times . 14 April 1991, 11.
34
"South America's War Against Drugs," The Miami Herald . 8
December 1991, 14.
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support to the DPF and some air surveillance. The largest
visible support the military has been providing is along the
country's Amazon borders.
In 1986 the Brazilian government announced the Calha
Norte project. The project called for the establishment of
small army bases along the country's borders with Colombia,
Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. The project
sought to draw settlers to these remote regions. The
project also called for the construction of roads and
airstrips to provide access into the remote northern Amazon
region. A similar presence already exists along the borders
with Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Argentina and Uruguay. A
number of reasons have been given for the implementation of
the Calha Norte project, but the most plausible are as
follows:
• The project justified the military's existence and gave
it a more "professional" role by linking it to national
development plans. Consequently, government budgetary
support for the military would be ensured.
• The project was a response to the fear that guerrilla
and drug-related violence might spill over from the
Andean region.
"Military to Strengthen Border Against Traffickers,"
Madrid EFE . in Spanish, 30 March 1987, translated in FBIS, 2
April 1987, D2.
36 Andrew Hurrell, "The Politics of Amazonian
Deforestation," The Journal of Latin American Studies , February
1991, 206.
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In February 1991, after a Brazilian outpost along the
Colombian border had been attacked by drug
traffickers/guerrillas, the Brazilian government allocated
$1.3 million to continue the Calha Norte project and
strengthen Brazil's presence along the Colombian border.
According to U.S. government officials, Calha Norte and
other Brazilian military operations along the country's
Amazonian borders have no impact on the drug traffickers.
Ironically, the primary reason is lack of presence. The
military's border outposts are manned by approximately 20 -
3 personnel. Of this group only ten are combat troops and
the other 20 are support personnel, such as engineers and
doctors. Battalion-sized garrisons, such as the one at
Tabatinga, on the border near Leticia, Colombia, have been
formed to support the more remote outposts. These garrisons
lack any dedicated air lift to rapidly deploy additional
troops to a crisis area. The personnel at these outposts do
not actively patrol for drug traffickers, but if
traffickers are encountered, they are apprehended and turned
over to the DPF.
"Colombian Border Incident Turns Sour," Latin American
Weekly Report . 28 March 1991, 3. Three Brazilian soldiers were
killed and nine others wounded. It was also reported that all of
the garrisons weapons were stolen.
U.S. Government Official, interview by author,
Washington, DC, 1 April 1992.
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By manning the border outposts with local conscripts the
military has developed an extensive intelligence network in
,39 .
the Amazon border region. In March 1992, the Brazilian
military moved a second infantry brigade into the Amazon
(approximately 500 troops) , including aviation assets to
40increase surveillance and mobility of troops. The move
was more likely a response to a number of border incidents
along the Venezuelan frontier than it was a response to drug
trafficking.
The military's support of the DPF has come primarily in
the form of airlift. In May of 1990, the army and air force
provided airlift for the DPF in an operation to dynamite
clandestine airstrips utilized by drug traffickers in the
42 . .
state of Roraima. In addition to air support, the
military has provided training to the DPF. This training
Ibid.
40 ....U.S. Government Official, interview by author,
Washington, DC, 2 April 1992.
41
"Army, Police, Add Patrols on Venezuelan Border," Rede
Globo Television , in Portuguese, 6 February 1992, translated in
FBIS, 7 February 1992, 22.
42 . ... . . .
"Destruction of Clandestine Airstrips to Begin," Brasilia
Radio Nacional de Amazonia Network , in Portuguese, 2 May 1990,
translated in FBIS . 3 May 1990, 32, and "Armed Forces Role in
Anti-drug Fight Discussed," O Globo . in Portuguese, 26 June 1990,
translated in FBIS . 28 June 1990, 28, states that the air force
provides pilots and planes for operations carried out by the
federal police.
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includes command, control and communications, small unit
tactics and jungle warfare.
In review, it is apparent that the Brazilian military is
playing a small role in the country's counter-drug efforts.
Only 18,000 troops are assigned to the military's Amazon
44 ....
command, thus only seven percent of Brazil's military is
committed to 50 percent of the territory. These numbers
suggest that the Brazilian military could deploy more assets
to the region for counter-drug support.
D. INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL COOPERATION & GOVERNMENT
LEGISLATION
The Brazilian government has always pursued a policy of
international and regional cooperation in counter-drugs. In
1987, Brazil signed agreements with Bolivia and Venezuela to
, .45
cooperate against the drug traffickers. ' In 1989, Brazil
also agreed to increase cooperation with Colombia on
46
controlling drug trafficking along the border. Brazil
43 ....
U.S. Government Official, interview by author,
Washington, DC 2 April 1992.
44 . .
"CMA Chief Views Army Role in Region," Folha de Sao
Paulo , in Portuguese, 15 January 1992, translated in FBIS . 27
February 1992, 18.
"Joint Anti-drug Program to Begin with Bolivia,'' Madrid
EFE, in Spanish, 24 April 1987, translated in FBIS . 20 April
1987, 5.
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"Itamaraty Spokesman on Drug effort with Colombia,"
Brasilia Domestic Service , in Portuguese, 2 6 October 1989,
translated in FBIS . 30 October 1989, 72.
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and the United States signed an agreement on the anti-
narcotics struggles in September 1986, but it only became
. 47policy with a presidential decree in July 1991.
The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations supported
the Cartagena anti-drug summit held in 1989. Brazil has
received counter-drug funds and equipment from the United
States, Europe and the United Nations. Nonetheless,
cooperation agreements signed by Brazil concerning the drug
trade are still at the incipient stage. Cooperation
consists primarily of intelligence sharing between Brazil's
federal police organization and its counterparts in the
countries with which Brazil has signed cooperative anti-drug
agreements. Although the Brazilian government recognizes
the transnational character of the drug trade, it has
refused any counter-drug assistance that seeks to militarize
the country's counter-drug efforts.
Domestically, the government of Brazil introduced a
comprehensive anti-drug bill to Congress in 1991. This bill
includes stiff provisions regarding all facets of the drug
48 ...trade. Also, the Congressional Committee of Inquiry on
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"Government on Anti-drug Struggle with U.S.," Voz do
Brasilia Network , in Portuguese, 14 August 1991, translated in
FBIS, 15 August 1991, 2.
48 .Congress Examines New Federal Drug Law , unclassified
message (DTG 281514Z OCT 91), American Embassy, Brasilia, Brazil,
1.
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Narco-traf fickinq investigated the country's drug problem
from April 1991 until November 1991. The committee's final
report called for the following:
A national drug policy
• Increased law enforcement resources
• Passage of the comprehensive drug legislation.
The Brazilian government continued to cooperate with the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to detect, monitor and
seize major diversions of precursor chemicals from both
Brazilian manufacturers and foreign sources.
E. ANALYSIS
In reviewing this chapter, it is quite apparent that the
government of Brazil is aware of and reacting to its growing
drug problem. Strengthening anti-drug legislation and
bilateral agreements with other nations are positive first
steps in developing a national drug strategy. However, as
so simply stated by the head of Brazil's federal police,
"men not miracles are needed" to counter Brazil's drug
problem.
The DPF has the constitutional responsibility for
enforcing the anti-drug law, but it is undermanned and ill-
equipped. In contrast, the Brazilian military has the
manpower and the equipment necessary to enhance the
49
INCSR: 1992 . 4.
Ibid.
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country's law enforcement capabilities, but lacks the legal
basis to enforce the law. The DPF has been targeted for
additional funding. Given limited resources , it seems that
the military stands to lose in the budget battle. Simply,
the DPF is strengthened at the expense of the military.
This is one of the dilemmas the Brazilian military faces by
opposing a greater role in counter-drug operations.
However, the Brazilian military currently has the
capability to conduct more effective counter-drug operations
than the DPF. This fact combined with the scale and
severity of Brazil's drug problem indicates that the
Brazilian military should play a larger role in counter-drug
operations. This role does not have to include extending
powers of arrest and seizure to the military, but should
focus more on better utilizing the military's capabilities
to assist the DPF in their law enforcement efforts.
The U.S. model is instructive. The U.S. Coast Guard
takes advantage of the U.S. Navy's greater capabilities by
multiplying their force capability through the use of Law
Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) . The LEDETS are a small
group of Coast Guard law enforcement officials attached to
naval vessels to carry out all arrests and seizures upon
discovery of illegal activity. Thus the Brazilian military
could similarly enhance the DPF's ability to combat drug
trafficking.
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The Brazilian military continues to resist any increase
in their counter-drug role. However, as illustrated by the
DPF and military's inevitable battle for funding, there are
pressures for the military to become more involved in
counter-drug operations. What these pressures are, and
where they come from, is the topic of discussion for Part II
of this study.
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IV. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PRESSURES
A. EXTERNAL PRESSURE: THE UNITED STATES
In 1982, due to the level of sophistication in the drug
trafficking organizations, the United States recognized that
military involvement was necessary to conduct effective
counter-drug operations in the United States and along its
borders. Following the rationale for involving the U.S.
military in counter-drug operations, the United States
counter-drug strategy in South America encourages Latin
American countries to actively engage their armed forces in
52
narcotics control activities.
In 1989, President George Bush outlined a comprehensive
national drug strategy that focused on both national and
international fronts. On the international front, the
President's Andean Strategy called for a five-year, $2.2
billion counter-drug effort to augment law enforcement,
military and economic resources in Colombia, Bolivia and
Peru. The policy encourages each of these countries to
militarize their anti-drug efforts and accept United States
Committee on Government Operations, Military Assistance
to Civilian Narcotics Law Enforcement: An Interim Report . Union
Calendar No. 576, House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 28
September 1982, 1-3.
52 Levitsky, The Andean Strategy . 1990.
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military training and logistical support, including, at
times, a quasi-operational role for U.S. personnel.
As the drug traffickers increasingly utilized Brazil as
a transhipment point for drugs to the United States, U.S.
officials began to pressure Brazil to sign a counter-drug
agreement, similar to the Andean Strategy, with the United
States. The primary focus of this pressure was on
convincing Brazil of the need to involve the Brazilian
military in counter-drug operations.
Evidence of the United States • increased interest in a
greater Brazilian counter-drug commitment was conveyed in a
speech by Melvyn Levitsky, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for International Narcotics Matters, when he stated that
Brazil was now "the traffickers' target country."
Additionally, further evidence of United States advisors
pressuring Brazil into committing their military to the
counter-drug effort is apparent in the U.S. Southern
Command's (USSOUTHCOM) attempts to conduct joint exercises
(US-Brazil) in the Amazon. The United States has designated
Peter Akin, "The Untied States and Latin America: Good
Neighbors Again?" Current History . February 1992, 52.
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"Government 'Apprehensive' Over U.S. Drug Role," Folha de
Sao Paulo , in Portuguese, 20 May 1991, translated in FBIS . 24 May
1991, 39.
"Just Say Who:...," The Wall Street Journal . 18 October
1991.
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U.S. military units that are playing an active role in
counter-drug operations in the Andean countries, as the
units to participate in the exercises. Clearly, this
strategy is an attempt to illustrate to the Brazilian
military how armed forces can play an effective role in
counter-drug operations.
The best example of the attempted utilization of this
strategy is in the U.S. Navy's South American riverine
program. The U.S. Navy has established effective riverine
programs in Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia to deny the drug
traffickers use of these countries' river networks.
However, U.S. Navy and Department of Defense officials
readily admit that without Brazilian involvement, the
riverine effort is virtually useless. As a result, U.S.
military officials lobbied the Brazilians hard to accept a
joint riverine exercise in the Amazon. The requests were
turned down.
U.S. pressure on the Brazilian government to further the
role of its military in counter-drug efforts reached its
zenith in the summer of 1991. The issue was widely
discussed in the Brazilian press and was a topic of
discussion in talks between Presidents Bush and Collor in
U.S. Navy Officer, interview by author, Monterey, CA, 29
January 1992.
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June of 1991. By September of 1991, U.S. pressure on
Brazil to further involve their military in counter-drug
operations had diminished. For example, in July of 1991
President Collor signed a decree promulgating a mutual
cooperation agreement with the U.S. government for fighting
drug trafficking. The agreement emphasizes that the United
States is committed to providing financial assistance to
Brazil's federal police; no further mention is made of
involving the Brazilian military in counter-drug
58
operations.
Additionally, in August of 1991, a conference on U.S.-
Brazilian cooperation in counter-drug operations was held in
Brasilia. The two countries pledged to commit equipment,
and human and financial resources to the drug problem.
However, Brazil's then foreign minister, Francisco Rezek,
explicitly stated that Brazil did not need the presence of
U.S. military advisors in the country to help combat the
escalating problem of drug trafficking. In response, Melvyn
"Government 'Apprehensive' Over U.S. Anti-drug Role,"
Folha de Sao Paulo . 20 May 1991, 39.
58
"Collor Promulgates 198 6 U.S. Anti-drug Agreement," Voz
do Brasil Network , in Portuguese, 24 July 1991, translated in
FBIS . 25 July 1991, 28.
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Levitsky, the US representative, announced that the U.S. had
59
no plans for sending advisors to Brazil anyway.
United States Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
visited Brazil in February of 1992 to discuss, among other
things, Brazil's role in combatting the international drug
trade. Secretary Cheney's visit illustrated the continued
U.S. desire for greater Brazilian military involvement in
counter-drug operations, but also reflected a change in the
U.S. strategy to convince the Brazilians of their need to
involve their military in counter-drug operations. The
following statement by Secretary Cheney provides evidence of
the evolving U.S. strategy:
I described for our Brazilian hosts the scope of the
effort being mounted by the United States military, but
also explained that — just as here in Brazil — we have a
strong tradition in the United States of drawing a line
between enforcement, on the one hand, which is the
responsibility of our police agencies, and the military
role of supporting law enforcement agencies in an effort
to control and interdict the flow of narcotics.
Secretary Cheney's statement indicates a U.S. desire for
greater use of the Brazilian military in counter-drug
operations, but does not advocate the total militarization,
59 . . .
"Government on Anti-drug Struggle with U.S." Brasilia Voz
do Brasil Network , in Portuguese, 14 August 1991, translated in
FBIS, 15 August 1991, 21; and "US Anti-drugs Help," Latin
American Regional Reports - Brazil . 19 September 1991, 10.
"Secretary of Defense Cheney's Press Conference," United
States Information Service . Brasilia, Brazil, 19 February 1992.
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as found in the Andean countries, of Brazil's counter-
drug efforts. Instead, Secretary Cheney emphasizes a larger
support role for the Brazilian military in counter-drug
operations, similar to the counter-drug mission of the U.S.
military. During an interview with the Brazilian press,
Secretary Cheney was explicitly asked whether he suggested
to the Brazilian government that the armed forces of Brazil
should involve themselves in combatting drugs. An excerpt
from Cheney's response was as follows:
That's really a matter for the Brazilian government to
decide. I simply shared with the Brazilian officials the
extent of our concern and described how we are approaching
the problem, and expressed our interest in cooperating
with them in every way possible.
Clearly, the United States still desires that the
Brazilian military assume a larger role in the counter-drug
effort. However, the United States has toned down its
efforts in convincing the Brazilians to further involve
their military in the counter-drug campaign. For example,
the U.S. is no longer committed to the notion that military
involvement in counter-drug operations is the best solution
to curtail drug trafficking in Brazil. In addition to the
For example, in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru the United
States has emphasized that these countries utilize their armed
forces to conduct a military campaign against the drug
traffickers. This campaign has included U.S. military advisors
and in some cases U.S. military units.
Ibid.
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military solution, Secretary Cheney has allowed for a
Brazilian answer to the drug problem; a solution that may
not advocate total militarization of Brazil's counter-drug
campaign.
The primary reason for the softening of U.S. efforts was
that the effects of the previous total militarization policy
were becoming counter-productive. For example, the
Brazilian military began linking the U.S. desire to conduct
joint counter-drug operations with the Brazilian armed
forces in the Amazon to an international effort to take over
the Amazon. This perception was best illustrated in October
of 1991, when Admiral Mario Cesar Flores, Minister of the
Navy, stated that no visible military threat to the Amazon
existed, but there were signs pointing to military
intervention. He claimed these signs were:
Repeated requests by the United States for the armed
forces to participate in military exercises with the
Brazilian Navy in the region [which were always turned
down]
.
Growing participation of U.S. troops with the Colombian
armed forces in the counter-drug campaign.
Admiral Flores interpreted these signs as a growing U.S.
desire to become acquainted with the theater of
. . 63
operations.
"Evidence of Foreign Military Intervention Exists,"
Globo, in Portuguese, 9 October 1991, translated in FBIS, 11
October 1991, 33-34.
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Based on this perspective, U.S. efforts to further
involve the Brazilian military in counter-drug operations
were not only ineffective, but pushing the Brazilian armed
forces further away from accepting the counter-drug mission.
Therefore, Cheney's visit can be interpreted as an attempt
to reconcile U.S. differences with the Brazilian military
over the use of armed forces in counter-drug operations.
Nonetheless, U.S. policy still reflects a desire for
increased Brazilian military involvement in the counter-drug
campaign.
For example, USSOUTHCOM is currently presenting
Brazilian military officials with a proposal for a combined
(the United States, Brazil, the Andean nations and
Venezuela) counter-drug exercise. Specifically, the
proposal requests the involvement of Brazilian aircraft and
personnel in a combined air interdiction operation against
the drug-traffickers. Additionally, the U.S. Navy has
incorporated riverine counter-drug training into its annual
UNITAS exercise. UNITAS is an annual exercise between U.S.
Navy units and their South American counterparts. Brazil is
a participant in the exercise and has been asked to
64participate in the riverine training.
64 ...U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy officer, interview by
author, Washington, DC, 1 April 1992.
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B. INTERNAL PRESSURES: BRAZILIAN POLITICAL SOCIETY
Government officials in Brazil have opposed the use of
the military in counter-drug operations. They view the
counter-drug mission as a function best carried out by the
federal police. However, there are some signs that
government officials in Brazil would like to see the
military assume a larger support role in the counter-drug
campaign. The trend in Brazil to commit more resources to
the counter-drug campaign is indirectly putting pressure on
the military to get involved in anti-drug operations. This
pressure results from the military's need to compete for the
government's limited financial resources and the
government's requirement for the military to justify their
financial requirements.
The growing severity of Brazil's drug problem has
resulted in a softening of the government's position on
allowing the military a greater role in the counter-drug
campaign. The Chamber of Deputies Commission for
Congressional Investigation (CPI) , which investigated drug
trafficking in Brazil, recommended that the armed forces
participate in the anti-drug fight along Brazil's borders
with Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay.
Specifically, the CPI recommended that the military
reinforce border control and prevent drug trafficking in the
41
country. CPI Coordinator Deputy Moroni Torgan outlined the
military's role as follows:
The armed forces ' role in the operation would be to
supervise and support the federal police. The federal
police role would undoubtedly be to arrest the drug
traffickers.
The Brazilian government is also studying plans for the
installation of a radar network in the Amazon region to
combat both devastation of the jungle and illegal use of the
airspace for drug trafficking. Although Brazil is seeking
funding for this project from external sources, once
installed, the Brazilian Air Force is to take the lead on
utilizing the system to control illegal air traffic in the
66
region.
These examples demonstrate both the government's
willingness to integrate the military into the counter-drug
campaign and the government's increased willingness to
allocate additional funds to counter-drug initiatives.
However, the Brazilian government seems to be content on
limiting the role of the military in the counter-drug
campaign and increasing funding to traditional Brazilian law
"Armed Forces' Role in Anti-drug Effort Discussed,"
Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network , in Portuguese, 25
September 1991, translated in FBIS, 26 September 1991, 21.
"Government Studying Radar Network for Amazon," Madrid
EFE, in Spanish, 28 June 1990, translated in FBIS . 29 June 1990,
30, and "Minister Supports Amazon Air Traffic Control," Brasilia
Voz do Brasil Network , in Portuguese, 22 August 1991, translated
in FBIS . 27 August 1991, 38.
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enforcement agencies. For example, as discussed in Section
III, the government has stated that the federal police will
be expanded and modernized and more recently the Brazilian
Institute for Renewable Natural Resources and Environmental
Affairs (IBAMA) , the equivalent of the US Environmental
Protection Agency, has been allocated the funding to
purchase 30 helicopters. These helicopters are to be
utilized for controlling illegal activities in the Amazon,
including deforestation and drug trafficking.
Additionally, foreign aid accepted by Brazil to fight
drug trafficking is distributed primarily to Brazilian law
enforcement agencies. With both internal and external funds
being utilized to modernize Brazil's law enforcement
agencies, it seems that the federal police will have better
logistical support than that currently granted to the armed
forces. ' This is a demoralizing prospect for a military
that desires to both increase and modernize its forces. The
best example illustrating the dilemma created by the
Brazilian government's preference for increasing funding to
law enforcement agencies at the expense of the military is a
proposal to create a Brazilian Coast Guard. This force
could be utilized to control Brazil's rivers and coasts and
"Anti-drug Aspect of Cheney Visit Discussed, ' O Estado de
Sao Paulo , in Portuguese, 21 February 1992, translated in FBIS,
26 February 1992, 24.
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would be a likely candidate for U.S. assistance. However,
the creation of a Coast Guard would mean that the Brazilian
Navy would have another domestic maritime force to compete
with for funding. With the Brazilian government's current
penchant for funding anti-drug activities, the Navy is bound
to lose the funding battle if a Brazilian Coast Guard is
created.
C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
In summary, it is apparent that current pressures for
the Brazilian military to assume a more significant role in
the counter-drug campaign are being exacerbated by internal
policies. Indirect and direct external pressure from the
United States still exists. Indirectly, the United States
supports Brazilian initiatives to increase the capabilities
of Brazil's law enforcement agencies. More directly, the
United States has pressed the Brazilian military to become
more involved in counter-drug efforts.
The primary internal pressure on the military stems from
the military's need for a role and increased funding at a
time of declining budget. As illustrated by the Coast Guard
example, counter-drug operations are a legitimate threat to
Brazil and the organizations responsible for conducting
68
"Creation of A Brazilian Coast Guard," Globo . 6 March
1992, 4-5.
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these operations will receive government funding. The
Brazilian military, which has resisted assuming a larger
role in counter-drug operations, has been a big loser in
recent government budget battles. Military modernization
programs have been curtailed and the armed forces have been
69forced to reduce training drastically.
With the end of the Cold War and apparent stability in
most of South America, the Brazilian military has had some
difficulty in finding a threat, greater than or equal to the
drug trade, that legitimatizes their request for increased
funding. It seems that the Brazilian government is prepared
to carry on a counter-drug campaign with or without greater
support from the military. There is evidence that
government officials in Brazil are willing to accept a
larger support role for the military in counter-drug
operations, but at the same time they are strengthening the
law enforcement agencies. This situation puts the onus of
assuming a counter-drug mission more on the military than
the government.
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"Budget Battle for Military Expenditures Detailed," Folha
de Sao Paulo , in Portuguese, 12 November 1990, translated in
FBIS . 19 November 1990, 44. In 1985, Brazil's military budget was
approximately .8% of GDP, by 1990 it was only .2% of GDP.
It is important to note that the Brazilian government
seems to accept a larger support role for the military in the
counter-drug campaign. However, there is no evidence that the
government wishes to grant the military extra judicial powers in
any counter-drug campaign.
45
Consequently, it is necessary to examine pressures
within the Brazilian military to assume a greater role in
the counter-drug campaign and those pressures that resist
the counter-drug mission. Section V examines those
conflicting pressures.
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V. THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY & THE DRUG PROBLEM
This chapter provides an examination of the Brazilian
military and the drug problem. It focuses on the major
issues and arguments that are driving the military's
institutional debate over assuming a larger role in counter-
drug operations. The major arguments for and against
greater military participation in the counter-drug campaign
are based on the following issues:
• The importance of the Brazilian military remaining a
legitimate and important institution in Brazilian
society; and
• The importance of not upsetting the balance of civil-
military relations.
In order to understand the significance of these issues and
the associated arguments, the first section of the chapter
reviews Alfred Stepan's theories on the military in newly
democratic regimes. Subsequent sections present the
competing arguments for a military counter-drug role, and
the chapter concludes with an analysis and discussion of the
findings.
A. THEORY
According to Alfred C. Stepan:
There are many dimensions of the problem of civilian
democratic control of the military, but two are of
particular saliency. One concerns the dimension of
47
articulated military contestation against the policies of
the new civilian democratic leadership. The other
concerns the dimension of military institutional
prerogatives .
The degree of articulated contestation by the military is
strongly affected by the extent to which there is intense
dispute or substantial agreement between the military and
the government concerning a number of key issues. Two key
issues outlined by Stepan are applicable to this study.
They are:
• The military's reaction toward the democratic
government's initiatives vis-a-vis the organizational
mission, structure and control of the military.
• The military budget, since budget cuts or increases can
play a particularly aggravating or ameliorating role.
According to Stepan, continuing high levels of articulated
contestation present threats to the continuing existence of
the democratic regime. Simply, government and military
disagreement over these issues could upset the balance of
civil-military relations.
The dimension of military institutional prerogatives is
defined by Stepan as follows:
Those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military
as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or
privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective
control over its internal governance, to play a role
within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or
Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil
and the Southern Cone . Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press,
1988, 68.
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even to structure relationships between the state and
political or civil society.
Military prerogatives are classified as low, moderate,
or high depending on who exercises the prerogative. For
example, if de jure and de facto effective control over the
prerogative is exercised by the civilians, through
procedures and institutions sanctioned by the democratic
regime, then the military's prerogative in this area is low.
If the military has de facto and de jure control over the
prerogative, it is classified as high, and in cases where
the military has been denied a prerogative, but the
democratic regime, due to active or passive non-compliance
by the military, does not effectively exercise this
prerogative, the military's prerogative is classified as
moderate. A number of traditionally important Brazilian
military prerogatives applicable to this study include
maintaining a significant role in the following:
• Internal order.
The Cabinet (maintaining active duty personnel in
ministerial positions)
.
• The posting of military personnel.
• The coordination of the defense sector.
According to Stepan, maintaining effective control of




political influence. For example, through cabinet
positions, military officers remain involved in general
political issues and have more autonomy over defense
initiatives. Additionally, the power to post personnel to
certain influential billets affords the military the ability
to influence government policy making.
Simply, Stepan's theory is that the relationship between
different levels of military contestation and military
prerogatives determine the balance of civil military
relations. However, military prerogatives and the issues of
military contestation also represent matters deemed
essential, by the military, for remaining an important and
legitimate institution in Brazilian society.
Consequently, Stepan's concepts of military contestation
and military prerogatives, and how they relate to civil-
military relations and the military institution, are
important in analyzing and understanding the relevance of
the competing arguments for greater Brazilian military
involvement in the counter-drug campaign.
B. SEARCHING FOR A NEW ROLE
After ruling the country for 21 years, the Brazilian
military relinquished control of the government to civilian
For a complete discussion of these prerogatives, see
Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics . 103-107.
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authorities in 1985. The Brazilian armed forces are the
largest in Latin America, but during the 21-year military
regime, the armed forces' budget had been among the lowest
(in relative terms) in Latin America, falling to less than
740.5 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) in 1985.
The military complained that these low expenditures had
left the military with outdated equipment, severe short-
falls in its technical capacity and the inability to project
power outside of Brazil. The expansion of Brazil's role in
the international arena and the lessons of the Malvinas War
indicated it was time to correct the shortcomings of the
armed forces. Consequently, Brazilian military leaders
welcomed the return to civilian rule, believing that the
removal of their governing responsibilities would allow them
to focus more directly on the expansion and modernization of
the armed forces.
The military's expansion and modernization plan was
designed to upgrade and professionalize the armed forces.
74 ....
"Military Boost Activity in Field," Brazil 1989 Annual
Report on Government. Business and Economy . June 1989, 24.
Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics . 86-87, points out
that Argentina's failure against the British task force revealed
to the Brazilian military that their forces were also inadequate
to fight and defeat another international power.
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: Theory and
Practice of Civil-Militarv Relations . Boston, MA, Harvard
University Press, 1957, states that military professionalism
consists of three ingredients: (1) expertness, (2) social
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It also emphasized a shift from an internal to an external
security role. For example, the army launched a program
to increase its operational capacity that emphasized troop
carrier helicopters to provide mobility in a conventional
land conflict. The navy announced plans to build nuclear-
powered submarines and improve their blue water capability;
and the air force announced a program to develop air-to-air
missiles and a new generation of jet fighters to enhance
their air superiority mission.
According to Stepan, these plans did not cause any
significant conflict with the new civilian government for
the following reasons:
Military expenditures by world standards had been low.
The plans had been developed by the military themselves
and were accepted by the government and legislature
without discussion (this was partially due to the
responsibility, and (3) corporate loyalty to fellow
practitioners. Therefore, professional armed forces are
technicians in the management and organization of violence; they
feel a responsibility to their client (the state) and they have a
powerful corporate tradition and organization.
This shift in roles was in response to the military's
need to professionalize. For example, from 1964-85 a major part
of the professional identification of the leaders of the
Brazilian military had been supplied by their role as direct
managers of the polity and their struggle against internal
enemies. Shifting to an external security role gave the armed
forces a more professional mission and moved them away from the
non-military mission of governance. Stepan, Rethinking Military
Politics . 86.
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For a complete discussion of the military's modernization
initiatives, see Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics . 86-89.
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civilian desire to see military attention turned to
more conventional external defense missions)
.
The government did not propose any new ways for
civilians to increase their control of the military.
The current lack of any serious external threats
combined with Brazil's economic problems have brought the
• . 80
military's expansion and modernization plans to a halt.
Of even more concern to the military is the growing debate
among Brazilian elites concerning the logic of maintaining
the armed forces in their present structure.
The military's dilemma is summed up in the following
excerpt from a Sao Paulo newspaper:
The Brazilian Armed Forces are experiencing a crisis. The
collapse of communism; the political, cultural and
economic rapprochement with Argentina, the most
traditional rival of Brazil in the continent; the absence
of real foreign enemies; and the high technology employed
in the Persian Gulf crisis, which threatens to make the
technologically little-advanced arsenal useless, are
leaving Brazilian military officers in a state of soul
searching.
Based on these conditions, members of the Brazilian
Congress have called for a major restructuring of the armed




For a complete discussion of the economic effects on the
military see "Budget Battle for Military Expenditures Detailed,"
Folha de Sao Paulo , in Portuguese, 12 November 1990, translated
in FBIS . 19 November 1990, 44.
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"Armed Forces Said Experiencing Raison D'etre," O Estado
de Sao Paulo , in Portuguese, 8 December 1991, translated in FBIS .
17 December 1991, 32.
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the number of troops to adapt the military to the reality of
the federal budget. However, the military's modernization
plans have also come under attack. For example, Deputy
Roberto Campos, a former planning minister under the
military regime, said:
The money employed in the construction of the nuclear
submarine could be better used, for example, in research
to see who is threatening us.
Other members of Congress have adroitly pointed out that
although the armed forces receive less funding than most
Latin American countries, this money is being used badly.
They claim the armed forces have grown too big and
bureaucratic, with an inordinate proportion of the military
budget being spent on the perquisites granted to senior
83
military officials.
In addition to the legislature's debate concerning
military structure and budget reductions, an initiative has
recently been approved, by the legislature, to curtail the
military's right to take major initiatives in the area of
domestic order. In order to increase civilian control of






single defense ministry; although it is unlikely that such a
... .84
ministry will be created for some time.
In summary, due to the lack of any serious external
threats and Brazil's economic difficulties, the military's
control over a number of traditionally important issues and
prerogatives is threatened. According to Stepan, in order
for the military to remain an important and legitimate
institution in Brazilian society, civilian control of these
particular issues and prerogatives is essential: (1)
government initiatives to alter or reduce the budget,
missions, and structure of the armed forces; (2) the
military's internal role; and (3) active duty personnel in
ministerial positions. The very debate concerning the
control of these issues and prerogatives represents a threat
to the balance of civil-military relations in Brazil.
The Brazilian military has responded to the debate over
its future and funding by presenting a number of scenarios
that the armed forces must be prepared to defend against.
These scenarios were published by the Escola Superior de
Guerra (Brazilian War College) in a document entitled
"1990 - 2000 — Vital Decade." This paper emphasized that
the military must be prepared to defend against threats to
84 See "Draft Bill on Use of the Armed Forces Approved,"
Estado de Sap Paulo , in Portuguese, 11 April 1991, translated in
FBIS, 22 May 1991, 21.
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the Amazon from drug-traffickers , environmentalists and
smugglers. According to the paper, the United States'
emphasis on militarizing the drug war is no more than a
cover for U.S. intervention in the region. The paper also
states that a coalition of "First World" countries and
85
environmental groups might try to occupy the Amazon.
Finally, the paper points out that it is not improbable
that in the coming years the police forces might not be able
to cope with rising urban crime. In this situation, the
military will have to take on the responsibility of
86
neutralizing and destroying criminal elements.
Although it is highly unlikely that a foreign invasion
of the Amazon will occur or is even being planned, the
military's concern over control of the Amazon and
proliferation of crime in the cities is justified. As
pointed out in Section II, drug trafficking has expanded in
the Amazon region and is undermining social and legal
institutions in the country's cities. Additionally,
Brazilian troops have been attacked by guerrillas and drug
traffickers along the Colombian border and, despite the
85
"War is Proposed to Save Amazonia," Latin American Weekly
Report . 14 June 1990, 15.
"Clube Militar Warns of Destabilization, " Latin American
Regional Reports: Brazil . 28 November 1991, 6.
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Calha Norte project, military control of this region of the
Amazon is insufficient.
A brief analysis of these scenarios illustrates the
military's attempts to retain control over the issues and
prerogatives that have traditionally been important to them.
The scenario illustrating the potential requirement for a
military role in controlling crime in Brazil's cities
reflects the armed forces' desire to remain involved in
ensuring internal order. The threat posed by guerrillas and
narco-traf fickers along the Amazon border region provides
the justification for the military to maintain its current
level of funding.
The government's response to these scenarios can be
characterized as lukewarm. For instance, there is evidence
that President Collor has considered utilizing the military
to control crime in Rio de Janeiro, but the "Amazon
intervention" scenario is generally viewed as fiction by
87Collor. Consequently, it is unlikely that these
potential threats will provide sufficient justification for
the military to expand its prerogatives.
87 See "Tinoco Views Strikes, Drug Operations, Bomb,"
Correio Braziliense. in Portuguese, 12 August 1990, translated in
FBIS. 12 September 1990, 40, and "The War of the Idiots," Folha
De Sao Paulo, in Portuguese, 15 January 1992, translated in FBIS.
27 February 1992, 19.
57
However, Brazil's drug problem represents a real and
immediate danger to national security, and it exacerbates
other threats in both the Amazon and the cities. Therefore,
emphasizing a larger military counter-drug role, as part of
the response to the Amazon and urban threats, could greatly
enhance the military's ability to retain control over
institutionally important issues and prerogatives.
In summary, accepting a larger role in the counter-drug
campaign could provide the military with the justification
it needs for maintaining its current level of funding and
retaining important military prerogatives. Furthermore, the
threat to internal stability posed by guerrillas and narco-
traffickers along the Amazon border region makes the
counter-drug mission a constitutionally legitimate military
role. Finally, the counter-drug role adds a significant
amount of realism to the threat scenarios presented by the
military. Despite this initial evidence that illustrates the
political benefit of the counter-drug role to the armed
forces, military officials remain adamant in resisting the
anti-drug role.
88 For example, when retired army colonel Pericles da Cunha
called for the military to reorganize and join the war on drugs,
he was thrown in jail for ten days. "Brazil's Brass Fights War of
Words," The Washington Post . 14 July 1991.
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C. RESISTING THE COUNTER-DRUG MISSION
The counter-drug mission in Brazil is primarily an
internal defense mission. Therefore, an examination of the
military's reluctance to become more involved in the
counter-drug campaign begins with analyzing the historical
precedents that warn against a more pervasive internal
defense role for the armed forces.
Examining armed forces initiatives during the height of
the military regime's anti-subversion campaign (1969-1972),
illustrates the armed forces' concern that assuming a
pervasive internal security role could adversely affect the
military institution. For example, in 1969, Operascao
Bandeirantes (OBAN) was created. It was a combination of
civilian police officers and military security officers who
carried out a campaign of repression against subversives.
Military support for this campaign, however, was far from
unanimous. Second Army Commander General Carvalho Lisboa,
based in Sao Paulo, refused to cooperate in the creation of
OBAN. He and other army skeptics argued that the military
were not trained to carry out police functions. Other
critics within the army argued that by assuming a police
function, the army would jeopardize its ability to carry out
its traditional role in Brazilian society. Finally, the
critics argued that participating in the repressive
apparatus would expose officers to possible corruption.
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OBAN squads, for example, had access to cash or valuables
89
seized in raids.
In retrospect, the concerns of General Lisboa and the
other skeptics turned out to be valid. Inadequate training
in civil police functions led to the brutalization of
civilians and repression was extensively used to stifle
opposition to government policies. The military was
notorious for its use of torture against Brazilian citizens.
Torture under the army command was so widespread and
institutionalized that no higher military authority could
. . 90 . .
claim non-involvement. Additionally, a high degree of
corruption was associated with military personnel involved
91in anti-subversive activities. Consequently, by the end
of military rule, Brazilian society had a very low opinion
of the military, and the professional image of the armed
92forces had been badly tarnished.
These same concerns are also relevant to the debate over
increased military involvement in the anti-drug campaign.
The military still does not receive training in civil police
89 Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule. 1964-85 .





92 For a complete discussion of these consequences, see
Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics . 54-59 and Skidmore, The
Politics of Military Rule . 267-273.
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functions. The involvement of the armed forces in the
prosecution of such a pervasive enemy could revive grim
memories of the military's repression in the previous anti-
subversion campaign.
Additionally, the military's previous fears that
participation in internal security affairs would expose the
armed forces to corruption are even more relevant when
conducting counter-drug operations. As pointed out earlier,
drug-related corruption has already penetrated the federal
police and the country's legislature. In Peru and Bolivia,
where the military takes an active role in combatting the
drug traffickers, the armed forces are riddled with
93 ..... .
corruption. " The Brazilian military is not immune to this
type of corruption. For example, a Brazilian private makes
$95 per month and a general $2,768. In Peru, drug
traffickers have paid military personnel as much $60,000 to
94look the other way on smuggling operations.
93 . . . .Stephen Trujillo, "Corruption and Cocaine in Peru," The
New York Times . 7 April 1992, 14. As evidenced by the following
excerpt, because of corruption, the Peruvian military's role in
anti-drug operations is counter-productive:
The drug war in Peru has long been paralyzed by the Peruvian
government's inability to control its own army. The traffickers
have forged relationships with senior army officers who do not
see cocaine as a threat to national security.
94 . .
"Army Units Aid Drug Trade in Peru," The Miami Herald . 31
December 1990, 18.
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The Brazilian military has demonstrated a real concern
for the debilitating effects of drug trafficking on the
professionalism of the armed forces and has even implemented
. 95
a drug awareness program — Projeto de Esperanca. ' In
summary , the military's desire to professionalize their
forces, the corrupting nature of narco-trafficking and the
illegality associated with the military's previous law
enforcement operations argues against further military
involvement in the counter-drug campaign.
A number of social, political, and economic factors have
influenced the armed forces ' reluctance to become more
involved in anti-drug operations. An important social
objective of any military organization is to maintain a high
level of prestige in the eyes of society and the military
institution. The Brazilian military has always afforded
itself a high level of prestige. It tries to maintain this
level of prestige by:
Representing Brazil as an international power, by
demonstrating that they are an effective modern and
professional military power.
Maintaining a corporate intellectual capacity, through
reputable military schools of higher learning.
95 U.S. Army Officer, interview with author, Washington, DC,
30 March 1992.
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Rewarding military officials with social perquisites,
to emphasize their importance to the military and
society.
As evidenced by their modernization plans, the military
associates prestige with modern conventional weapons and
capabilities. To conduct an unconventional war against drug
traffickers is considered belittling to the prestige of the
armed forces. Brazilian naval officers find riverine
warfare to be a "low" form of naval warfare, not befitting
their training, traditions and aptitudes, and the air force
shows a similar disdain for counter-insurgency air
warfare.
The military's prestige is also threatened by getting
involved in a counter-drug war that they might not be able
to win. Brazilians interpret the cooperation of Colombia,
Peru and Bolivia with U.S. counter-drug efforts as a
relationship based on the economic and political weakness of
those countries. Therefore, Brazilians believe that
extensive cooperation with the United States would be an
admission of weakness. Furthermore, despite a significant
96
These three notions were compiled from the following
references: Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South
America . New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1982, 34-41, and
Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics . 86-89.
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"Amazonas Rex: The Specter of an Amazon Invasion Haunts
the Military," InfoBrazil, 1 November 1991, 12. Additionally,
discussions with private and public officials who have discussed
this issue with Brazilian military officials reveal the same
findings.
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effort by the Untied States and the Andean nations, the
overall success of the combined counter-drug campaign is
dubious. According to U.S. officials the amount of cocaine
being produced and shipped out of the Andean region has
steadily increased.
Consequently, why should the Brazilian military involve
itself in a campaign that has been proven, by a superpower,
to be difficult to win? Also, with the likelihood of
failure so prominent, the military risks the chance of
illustrating that Brazil is no more capable than the Andean
countries of controlling drug-trafficking. The military
institution could be demoralized by the failure of their
actions and society could blame the military for diminishing
the country's international stature. A recent example of
this was the Argentine military's failure in the Malvinas
War.
Another example of military prestige being threatened is
related to the disposition of military forces throughout
Brazil. For example, approximately 90% of the armed forces
are situated in the capitals of the eastern and southern
states. These capitals, particularly Brasilia, Rio de
Janeiro and Sao Paulo, are the economic, political and
cultural centers of Brazil. By being headquartered in these
98
U.S. Navy Officer, interview by author, Washington, DC,
30 March 1992.
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cities, military officials are in contact with the
cosmopolitan sector of Brazilian society. For an
institution that perceives itself as a major contributor to
Brazil's emergence as a new power in the international
arena, remaining in contact with the country's political,
social, commercial and intellectual centers is important for
prestige.
A military shift toward counter-drug operations would
most likely be accompanied by the re-deployment of Brazilian
. . 99troops from the capital to the Amazon region. This move
would reduce the military's prestige by moving it from the
center to the periphery of Brazilian society.
Examining the military's lack of interest in the
counter-drug campaign from a political perspective is best
accomplished by analyzing the military's prerogative for
maintaining effective control of internal stability and the
political influence associated with it. The analysis is once
again focused on the large troop presence in Brazil's
cities.
Historically, due to the importance of eastern and
southern cities, the military's presence in these cities has
afforded them a certain amount of political influence. The
99 Since the core of Brazil's drug problem is the drug
traffickers' unimpeded use of the Amazon for producing and
shipping narcotics, greater military involvement in the anti-
drug campaign will most likely be in the Amazon.
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military regime headquartered its best troop units and most
modern equipment in the country's urban centers, in order to
maintain internal stability. Command of the First Army in
Rio de Janeiro was considered a coveted assignment. In
1992, the military demonstrated its continued interest in
internal stability by patrolling the streets of Rio de
Janeiro to deter criminal activity.
Paradoxically, exercising this internal order role
affords the military political influence, by increasing its
legitimacy in the eyes of the population. For example, the
military is given the opportunity to demonstrate its
willingness and ability to correct the shortfalls created by
government policies (in this case, crime as a result of
failing economic plans) . Additionally, public support of
the military increases as a show of force usually results in
a drop in criminal activity. This is important because it
associates the military with a positive effect, while the
government is plagued by the negative effects of bad
economic policies.
Consequently, because of the military's desire to remain
involved in ensuring internal stability, and their recent
100 •Richard Nyrop, ed. , Brazil: A Country Study . Washington,
DC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1983, 311.
U.S. Army Officer, interview by author, Washington, DC,
30 March 1992.
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and close association with national politics, the deployment
of the majority of Brazil's troops in the cities continues
to afford the military political influence. Re-deployment
of these troops to participate in a counter-drug campaign in
the Amazon would reduce that influence.
The military also continues to offer the argument that
they cannot join a direct anti-drug fight because they have
no funding for it. This statement is true, but it is
probably more accurate to argue that the military's
reluctance to finance an anti-drug campaign is the result of
their desire to develop a modern, conventional warfare
capability, and their disdain for unconventional warfare.
Procuring or improving the equipment required for the
counter-drug mission would detract from the military's
ability to purchase the equipment needed to support the more
prestigious conventional warfare missions. For example, the
Navy is not interested in building a "brown-water" force of
riverine craft that would detract from its blue water
mission. The army has illustrated similar prejudices toward
unconventional warfare by purchasing French-built Puma and
Squirrel helicopters. These helicopters are best suited for
This argument was presented by Army Chief of Staff
General Antonio Moreira in "Cheney Discusses Nuclear Technology,
Drugs," Brasilia Radio Nacional do Amazonia Network , in
Portuguese, 20 February 1992, translated in FBIS . 21 February
1992, 20.
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conventional warfare in Brazil's more temperate climes
rather than counter-insurgency operations in a jungle
environment. With limited financial resources, the
Brazilian military would rather fund the more prestigious
conventional warfare requirements rather than finance a
counter-drug campaign.
D. LEGITIMIZING GREATER MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE
COUNTER-DRUG CAMPAIGN
This section examines arguments for greater Brazilian
military involvement in the counter-drug campaign.
Legitimizing the counter-drug role begins with examining
Brazil's geopolitical concepts. Geopolitics is simply the
relationship between power politics and geography. It
reflects the concerns that the diplomat and military planner
must keep in mind as they analyze how geographic factors can
hinder or enhance their actions in the world arena.
Brazilian geopolitical thought is considered to be the
most significant in Latin America. Several geopolitical
concepts are adhered to in Brazil. The dominant
characteristic of Brazilian geopolitical thinking has been
the emphasis on the seemingly inevitable Brazilian path to
"grandeza" ("greatness") , the code word for the moment when
Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America .
1982, 19-21.
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Brazil will become the first major power to emerge from the
Southern Hemisphere.
In order to achieve grandeza, Brazilian geostrategists
have primarily followed the geopolitical concept put forth
by deceased Brazilian General Golberry do Couto e Silva.
Golberry viewed Brazil as an archipelago consisting of a
series of isolated islands and peninsulas. In order for
Brazil to develop, it must somehow link these various
isolated regions together through a network of
transportation links. Golberry perceived the internal
development of Brazil as a necessary step toward achieving
grandeza. Therefore, Brazil's internal development and
control of national territories would lead to continental
projection and growing international influence. His
prescriptions for grandeza included:
National integration and the effective use of the
national territory.
Interior expansion and peaceful external expansion.
Containment along the frontier.
Participation in the defense of western civilization.
Continental collaboration.
. 104Cooperation with the developing world.
104 . . .Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America .
New York, Praeger Publishers, 1982, 25.
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Based on these objectives, the Brazilian military has
placed a great emphasis on occupying the country's Amazon
region. Historically, control of the Amazon region has
always been important to Brazil, and during the 21-year
military regime a great emphasis was placed on Amazon
development. For example, the military embarked on a
massive road building plan to penetrate the Amazon region.
When the military relinquished power in 1985, they
announced the implementation of the Calha Norte project and
the reorganization of the Amazon command. The
reorganization involved the transfer of army units from the
strategically important first and third corps, located in
the eastern and southern states, to the Amazon. These
events illustrate the military's continued high level of
interest in the Amazon.
The Calha Norte project and a number of components
involved in the reorganization of the Amazon command have
been suspended due to the lack of adequate resources,
despite the military's geopolitical interest in the Amazon
region. In light of recent border incidents with
Colombia and Venezuela, the armed forces have recently
received additional funding for increasing and improving
See "Budget Battle for Military Expenditures Detailed,"
Folha de Sao Paulo , in Portuguese, 12 November 1990, translated
in FBIS, 19 November 1990, 44.
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their presence in the Amazon. However, rational occupation
of the Amazon is far from complete, and according to General
Pacheco, Military Commander of the Amazon,
The Army's force in the Amazon is just a beginning, but it
is as big as the nation can presently assign.
The narco-traf fickers' unimpeded use of the Amazon
region for producing and shipping drugs represents the core
of Brazil's drug problem. Therefore, military plans for
increasing their control over this region could help to
alleviate the country's drug problem. This discussion
outlines the symbiotic relationship that exists between
greater military involvement in anti-drug operations and the
military's geopolitical objective of effectively controlling
the Amazon.
The Calha Norte project and the reorganization of the
Amazon command demonstrate that the military has developed
both the initial infrastructure and its control over the
Amazon region. The counter-drug mission could provide the
justification to increase funding for the military's plans
to achieve control of the Amazon, thereby realizing their
geopolitical objectives.
The counter-drug mission also allows the military access
to external anti-drug assistance. For example, the United
"CMA Chief View Army Role in Regions," Folha de Sao
Paulo , in Portuguese, 15 January 1992, translated in FBIS, 27
February 1992, 18.
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States offers security assistance to countries that
cooperate with the United States in the counter-drug
campaign. In many cases, this assistance has included
military hardware such as coastal and riverine patrol craft,
helicopters, trucks, radios and uniforms. This assistance
could allow the military to continue funding for its force
modernization and improve its capability to effectively
control the Amazon.
In summary, this section has reviewed economic and
geopolitical arguments for the Brazilian military to assume
a larger role in counter-drug operations. All of the
arguments reflect the institutional interests of the armed
forces and justify the military's existence and funding
requirements by giving it a role in combatting a problem of
national significance.
E. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
It is evident that the Brazilian military is primarily
concerned with defining a raison d'etre that ensures that
the armed forces remain a legitimate and important
institution in Brazilian society. In order to accomplish
these tasks, the armed forces have focused on defining
threats that require the preservation of the archaic
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structure, traditional missions and prestige associated
with the existing military institution. Due to historical
precedent, the subversive nature of the drug trade, and
threats to military prerogatives, the armed forces have
avoided using the counter-drug mission to help define its
existence.
However, the seriousness of Brazil's economic problems
and the lack of any serious threats are issues that the
military cannot ignore. In the context of these issues, it
is highly unlikely that the military's current strategy for
preserving the prominence of the institution will succeed.
For example, maintaining large military forces for defense
and prestige is a costly endeavor when no serious external
threat exists. Additionally, the Persian Gulf War
demonstrated that a large military force no longer
guarantees a nation adequate defense. One lesson of the war
was that quality and not quantity of forces was essential to
the outcome of modern warfare. It is apparent, therefore,
that the military's strategy of preserving the archaic
structure of the armed forces to ensure the military remains
a legitimate and important institution is flawed.
This refers primarily to Brazil's large military forces,
but also includes the current disposition of troops in the cities
and southern part of the country (despite a greatly diminished
Argentine threat) and the military's continued emphasis on heavy
conventional forces.
73
Furthermore, without including the counter-drug mission, the
threat scenarios presented by the armed forces lack the
characteristics to preserve the traditional missions and
prestige associated with the existing military institution.
Based on this evidence, it can be argued that by
including the counter-drug mission in the definition of the
military's raison d'etre and by discontinuing the strategy
of preserving obsolete forces structures and accepting the
concept of a smaller quality force, the armed forces are
more apt to remain a legitimate and important institution.
The following paragraphs outline the new strategy.
The counter-drug mission could enhance military prestige
and institutional. To remain a legitimate force, the armed
forces cannot ignore the threats to its control over the
Amazon border region that the narco-trafficker and
guerrillas armies pose. In this case, the military would
clearly be defending internal stability against an external
threat, therefore the military would retain its prerogative
of internal control by defending against a legitimate
threat.
Military prestige and legitimacy is further enhanced by
linking the counter-drug mission with the geopolitical
objective of controlling the Amazon. For example, linking
the military with national development (control of the
Amazon) rather than fictional threats, enhances society's
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view of the military, and the counter-drug mission increases
the significance of the military's geopolitical strategy, a
valuable source of institutional prestige.
The expansion of the military's role in the counter-drug
war could be linked to a smaller, but qualitatively improved
military force. Reducing the force could allow for pay
increases and more money would be available for properly
equipping and training the force. These initiatives could
enhance professionalism and reduce the military's
susceptibility to the corruption associated with drug
trafficking.
Fears that greater military participation in the
counter-drug campaign will upset Brazil's civil-military
relations are not unfounded. Improving the counter-
insurgency capabilities of a military that has previously
involved itself in national politics is a risky proposition.
However, increased drug trafficking and production could
threaten democracy as they have in Colombia. Furthermore,
the current debate over the military budget and structure, a
debate devoid of the counter-drug issue, also risks
upsetting the balance of civil-military relations. The
military is losing prerogatives, and current debates over
military salaries, advanced weapons programs and the
creation of a defense ministry have raised the level of
military contestation. A smaller, more professional
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military would perhaps be less inclined to intervene in the
108political arena.
Another step to ensure the proper balance of civil-
military relations would be the establishment of a single
defense ministry, headed by a civilian. This organization
could encourage jointness among the services (beneficial for
conducting a multi-faceted counter-drug war and for
projecting power) and provide additional oversight of the
armed forces. The military has traditionally opposed the
idea, but support for a defense ministry is growing within
. . . n . 109the military*
In summary, the Brazilian military is at a crossroads.
A strategy that advocates the preservation of the existing
force structure based on traditional external threats, while
ignoring the drug threat, is no longer credible. The
military has watched traditional external threats dissipate.
In contrast, the national drug problem has grown, and
provided the justification for modernizing law enforcement
agencies and proposing a Coast Guard. Military officers
108 Huntington, The Soldier and the State . Harvard, 1957,
argues that the surest way to insulate the military from politics
is to encourage them to be fully professional.
109
"New Armed Forces General Staff Chief Sworn In," Rede
Globo Television , in Portuguese, 5 January 1990, translated in
FBIS . 5 January 1990, 57, and "Document Urges Creation of New
Defense Ministry," Estado de Sao Paulo , in Portuguese, 19
February 1992, translated in FBIS . 26 February 1992, 23.
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stationed in the Amazon region are becoming increasingly
aware of the economic and political benefits that the
counter-drug mission offers to the armed forces. They are
acting against illicit drug trafficking and are in favor of
an expanded military role in counter-drug operations. There
has also been an interest among Brazilian junior officers to
become more involved in the anti-drug effort.
Brazilian military officials are faced with some
difficult decisions concerning the future role of the armed
forces, but economic and political realities dictate that
the military must succumb to the forces of change. The
evidence suggests that in order for the armed forces to
remain a legitimate and important institution in Brazilian
society, more emphasis should be placed on pursuing a
strategy that advocates a small, quality force, with greater
participation in the counter-drug campaign.
U.S. Army Officer, interview by author, Washington, DC,
29 March 1992.
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VI. POTENTIAL MILITARY COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS
Parts one and two of this thesis (Sections II-V) have
suggested that the growing severity of the Brazilian drug
problem and the military's institutional crisis indicate
that the Brazilian military could become more involved in
the counter-drug campaign.
Controlling narco-trafficking and supporting the
consolidation of democracy are important internal missions
for Brazil and represent the strategic objectives of the
United States in the Latin American region. Part three
(Sections VI-VII) examines potential military counter-drug
missions and how they might affect military professionalism
and the balance of civil-military relations. It also
discusses the potential role of the United States in
supporting Brazilian military involvement in the anti-drug
campaign and empowering democracy.
A. DEFINING THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY'S FUTURE COUNTER-DRUG
ROLE
In order to define an expanded Brazilian military role
in the counter-drug campaign, one must first look at the
"SOUTHCOM Strategy Process," professional lecture, U.S
Naval Postgraduate School, November 1991.
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U.S. military role in counter-drug operations. Secretary
Cheney, during his visit with Brazilian military officials,
stated:
Just as here in Brazil, we have a strong tradition in the
United States on drawing a line between law enforcement,
on one hand, which is the responsibility of our police
agencies, and the military role of supporting law
enforcement agencies.
As discussed in Section III, the Brazilian military does
assist the federal police in the counter-drug campaign.
However, this support was never significant and because of
economic constraints and the military's preference for
funding advanced weaponry, support for the DPF has been
further reduced. An appropriate future role for the
Brazilian military in counter-drug operations is support of
law enforcement agencies, and not law enforcement.
The Brazilian military's role in counter-drug operations
could, therefore, consist of the following missions:
Air, land and maritime interdiction.
• Manpower, equipment, logistical training and
communications support to law enforcement agencies.
• Intelligence operations in support of law enforcement
agencies.
"Secretary of Defense Cheney's Press Campaign," United
States Information Service, Brasilia, Brazil, 20 February 1992,
1.
"Budget Battle for Military Expenditures Detailed," Folha
de Sao Paulo , in Portuguese, 12 November 1990, translated in
FBIS, 19 November 1990, 44.
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These missions will be discussed at length in the next
section, but it is important to note that support, and not
law enforcement, is the role guiding these missions. The
works of Samuel Huntington and Alfred Stepan illustrate that
allowing the armed forces to arrest people and execute
search warrants are contradictory to the goals of
democratization and military professionalism. For example,
according to Stepan, the Brazilian military's involvement in
the legal system is a "high" military prerogative,
therefore, potentially disruptive to civilian control of
government. Additionally, training the armed forces in the
legal requirements of law enforcement detracts resources
from the military's training missions that enhance their
ability to effectively manage and organize violence. Flying
support missions for the DPF, or conducting counter-drug
patrols in company with DPF units are missions that do not
detract from the military's professional mission.
In order to keep the military's counter-drug role
focused on support, Brazil needs to develop a national drug
strategy and create an organization to oversee and implement
drug control strategies and agencies. The formulation of
the new federal drug law and the recommendations of the
congressional investigative committee on narcotics indicate
that Brazil is on the verge of promulgating a national drug
strategy. A National Drug Policy Board, similar to the U.S.
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model, consisting of the government cabinet ministers and
chaired by the minister of justice, could be created. This
board would oversee the development of counter-drug
strategies and coordinate counter-drug operations. Current
Brazilian counter-drug strategies are twofold, emphasizing
both supply and demand reduction. This emphasis is adequate
and should remain the same.
The difficulty in making a National Drug Policy Board
effective is in coordinating the efforts of the agencies
involved in the actual operations. The autonomous nature of
the separate military services could be detrimental to joint
counter-drug operations. For example, successful
interdiction programs depend on timely intelligence and
rapid response from prosecuting units. This requires a
significant amount of interoperability among the military
services, a concept the Brazilian military has not yet
mastered. This inadequacy will probably be compounded when
trying to coordinate military and civilian joint operations.
One solution to this problem is the appointment of one
military commander to coordinate all military support and
one lead agency to coordinate joint military/DPF operations.
The appointment of one military commander to coordinate all
military support to civilian law enforcement agencies will
not only improve the effectiveness of counter-drug
operations, but could also mark the beginning of the
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military's acceptance of a joint military structure. The
presence of the separate service chiefs in the Cabinet makes
the latter initiative even more important. The military,
however, should not be the lead agency to coordinate all
counter-drug operations. The legal requirements of the
operations dictate that the federal police should remain in
charge of coordinating all operations.
Based on the conclusions presented in Section V, it is
important to note that the expanded role of the military in
counter-drug operations outlined in this section assumes
that a future Brazilian military will be smaller than the
current force. Additionally, Section II provides evidence
that indicates that Brazil's drug problem will become an
issue of national security importance. Therefore, anti-drug
strategies and operations will receive greater attention.
In sum, an expanded Brazilian military role in counter-
drug operations needs to be a component of a more
comprehensive national drug strategy. This new role should
emphasize support of civilian law enforcement operations and
not direct military participation in law enforcement.
Furthermore, the military possesses the unique capabilities
for an interdiction mission. These missions are discussed
in the next section.
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B. POTENTIAL USES 07 THE MILITARY IN ANTI-DRUG OPERATIONS
As pointed out in Section III, the DPF is inadequately
equipped and manned to conduct effective counter-drug
operations, particularly in the remote regions of the
Amazon. In order to illustrate how the military can enhance
DPF counter-drug operations an examination of specific anti-
drug activities is required.
The DPF's inability to effectively prosecute drug
trafficking operations in the Amazon border regions with
Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia and Peru can be corrected by
allowing DPF agents to accompany military patrols in the
area. If the military units encounter narco-traf fickers and
their operations, they could be apprehended and turned over
to the DPF agents for prosecution. These operations would
alleviate the DPF's manpower shortfalls and allow them to
push their law enforcement presence into remote areas, while
maintaining control over the towns that have become the
conduits for drugs being shipped to eastern Brazil.
Joint DPF/military patrols could be based on the Law
Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) principle utilized by the
United States. Simply, by adding two to four DPF personnel
to army patrols or naval patrols, the country's counter-drug
law enforcement capability is quickly multiplied.
Additionally, the military could greatly increase its
aviation support to the DPF, providing helicopters to move
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DPF agents to remote areas and aircraft (including
helicopters) to patrol the rivers and airspace. For
example, aircraft could be used to identify coca growing
areas, then helicopters could transport agents to the area
to destroy the crops.
The proposed air surveillance radar and the dedication
of more Brazilian military aircraft to interdiction missions
would greatly enhance the country's ability to deny drug
traffickers unimpeded access to Brazil's air space.
Patrolling Brazil's vast river network is a very large and
complex task. However, the navy does have a small "brown
water" capability and it has been used effectively to
support army actions against guerrillas along the Colombian
114 . .border. This action suggests that the Brazilians have a
rather sophisticated "brown water" capability, including the
ability to project and support riverine elements in remote
areas of the country. The DPF is currently receiving river
patrol craft from the United States and Europe; this force
could be used in conjunction with military units to
interdict drug traffickers on Brazil's rivers. The
Brazilians could utilize this mobile riverine force by
In March 1991, the navy deployed two patrol boats and a
gunboat on which helicopters could land to reinforce the
Colombian border after guerrilla raids into Brazil. "Border with
Colombia Reinforced Following Raids," Madrid EFE . in Spanish, 11
March 1991, translated in FBIS . 13 March 1991, 31.
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moving it to critical nodes in the Amazon river network,
then conducting operations for a designated period of time.
Again, the LEDET concept applies.
The DPF needs assistance in resolving the smuggling of
drugs through the Amazon port of Manaus and the coastal port
of Belem (outlet of the Amazon River) . The drugs are
smuggled through these ports in cargo containers. The high
volume of shipping through these areas presents a problem of
massive proportions to the DPF. They simply do not have the
manpower to inspect a large percentage of the containers.
Increasing these inspection rates would help reduce the flow
of drugs into Brazil's cities and out of the country. The
military could provide additional manpower to assist the DPF
in providing a higher rate of container inspections.
The intelligence that the military can provide the DPF
is invaluable to increasing the effectiveness of any of the
previously-discussed missions. According to US government
officials interviewed for this study, the Brazilian military
has an extensive intelligence network in the Amazon and
possesses the equipment necessary for sophisticated
intelligence operations. For example, military units are
specifically trained and equipped to conduct reconnaissance
and collect intelligence on targets. The DPF has no such
capability. Therefore, the military can provide direct and
indirect intelligence support to the DPF. Direct support
85
could be comprised of conducting actual intelligence
gathering operations in support of DPF counter-drug
operations and the sharing of drug-related intelligence with
the DPF. Indirect support could consist of the training of
DPF personnel in intelligence work and the assignment of
intelligence officers to DPF units.
Finally, the Brazilian military could increase its
training support to the DPF. This can be done by either
sending DPF agents to military bases for training or by
attaching military personnel to DPF units for training in
the field. However, because of the fine line between
operations and training while in the field, the training of
DPF agents at military bases is a better idea.
C. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Increasing the military's involvement in counter-drug
operations and at the same time respecting the potential
problems of decreasing military professionalism and
upsetting the balance of civil-military relations is best
accomplished by expanding the military's current role of
providing the DPF direct support in the anti-drug campaign.
The military infrastructure and plans for accomplishing this
expansion already exist. For example, the full
implementation of the Calha Norte project and the existence
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of the Brazilian jungle warfare school 115 both support
initiatives discussed in this chapter.
Political issues and the institutional resistance
discussed throughout this study will make this expanded
military role difficult to implement. Additionally,
institutional competition between the DPF and military over
their proper roles in society is quite high. DPF director
Tuma opposes further military involvement in the counter-
drug campaign, claiming his forces can prevail with
additional aid. The issue here, however, is not just
competition for institutional prestige, but competition
primarily for economic assets. The DPF's budget grows and
the military's shrinks. Additionally, the support and
logistical structure (including aircraft and boats) of the
DPF is growing rapidly. Therefore, DPF resistance to an
expanded military role in counter-drug operations is likely
to continue based on the fact that it will deprive them of
increasing the prominence of their institution. For
example, if the military increases logistical support to the
DPF, domestic funds are no longer required to enhance the
DPF's support structure. These funds could then be utilized
for a demand reduction program.
The school is located in Manaus and is designed to teach
jungle survival skills and counter-insurgency techniques.
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However, if the Brazilians are serious about controlling
their country's burgeoning drug problem, and the military
desires to remain a professional organization, expanding the
military's current role in the counter-drug war can assist
in the accomplishment of these objectives.
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VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
This section discusses the role of the United States in
supporting Brazilian military involvement in the anti-drug
campaign and in encouraging the consolidation of democracy
in Brazil.
A. FORMULATING A STRATEGY
The U.S. drug policy toward Brazil is based on Brazil's
role as a major transit country for cocaine and a major
producer of precursor chemicals. The U.S. strategy is
simple — its main objective is to curtail the flow of drugs
to the United States. Implementation of this strategy is
based on providing direct assistance to the DPF to promote
the investigation and elimination of international illicit
narcotics organizations, the reduction in the flow of
narcotics through Brazil, and disruption of illegal
precursor chemicals. Additionally, the United States
provides assistance to Brazilian government programs in drug
awareness, education and prevention, and has advocated the
use of the Brazilian military in the anti-drug campaign. It
is also important to note that the number one priority of
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the United States in South America is the promotion of
116democracy.
The main purpose of Brazil's counter-drug objectives is
to protect the nation from the debilitating effects of the
drug trade. Accomplishment of these goals has primarily
been through law enforcement and public awareness
initiatives. Additionally, civilian leaders are dedicated
to the continued process of democratization in Brazil.
As previously discussed, Brazil and the United States
have signed a bilateral agreement concerning cooperation in
anti-drug efforts. Under the agreement, the United States
is committed to providing financial assistance to Brazil to
undertake actions aimed at repressing and preventing the use
of drugs and rehabilitating drug addicts. Additionally, it
provides for an exchange of experts and meetings between
experts from both countries, whenever necessary in order to
trade information on fighting and repressing drug
trafficking. Based on the previous review of each
"Western Hemisphere Holds Unique Place For Freedom," U.S
Department of State Dispatch , 10 June 1991. This U.S. position
is evident in the following statement to the Organization of
American States (OAS) by Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger:
Our challenges [in the hemisphere] are clear. . .First, we must
consolidate democracy and be prepared, where necessary, to
defend democracy against its enemies.
117
"Col lor Promulgates 1986 U.S. Antidrug Agreement,"
Brasilia Voz do Brasil Network , in Portuguese, 24 July 1991,
translated in FBIS, 25 July 1991, 28-29.
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country's efforts, it seems apparent that a U.S. -Brazil
agreement would be mutually beneficial. However, a
disagreement over the use of Brazil's armed forces in
counter-drug operations has created serious tensions in the
U.S. -Brazil relationship. This disagreement stems primarily
from the level of interest each country affords the problem.
The United States has recognized drug trafficking to be an
issue of national security. However, Brazil has yet to give
the drug issues such a high priority, but the rapid growth
and pervasiveness of the problem has increased national
attention on the drug issue.
Drug trafficking is a transnational problem that is
devastating to every country involved and none of them can
avoid dealing with the problem. Therefore, based on the
characteristics of the drug problem, a multilateral or
regional rather than a bilateral strategy to fight the drug
traffickers is needed. For example, today nearly all South
American countries are linked by bilateral agreements on the
prevention of illegal drug trafficking and trade. Such
agreements, however, are virtually meaningless given the
shortages of equipment and manpower in the suppression
organizations. What is needed by the nations of the western
hemisphere is a strategy similar to that used to counter
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1 18international terrorism. The countries must recognize
the transnational nature of the drug problem, and respect
issues of national sovereignty in countering the problem.
A strategy based on these principles would have a
regional focus. This could reduce the tensions created by
the differing levels of interest that individual nations
afford to the drug problem. This type of strategy allows
the United States to pursue both its objectives of
curtailing the illegal drug trade and promoting democracy in
Latin America. By simply focusing on the U.S. national
security objective of stemming the flow of drugs northward,
the goal of promoting democracy in the region is
jeopardized. The risk is primarily in strengthening
military organizations that have a history of intervening in
their country's political process, to combat the drug
traffickers. For example, increasing the power of some
South American militaries may encourage them to marginalize
civilian government. Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil all
have a history of military rule.
1 18 There a number of treaties of cooperation concerning the
control of international terrorism, however, the most relevant
examples are (1) The International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages , promulgated 17 December 1979, and (2) Convention to
Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortions That are of International
Significance , signed in the Organization of American States (OAS)
in 1971.
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Respect of national sovereignty is extremely important
in dealing with Brazil. Brazilians seem to still believe in
the concept of "absolute sovereignty" and are extremely
sensitive to any rhetoric or actions that hint at a
violation of Brazilian sovereignty. Brazilian
sensitivities over the sovereignty issue further suggest
that a regional counter-drug strategy is the correct policy
for the United States to pursue in Brazil and Latin America.
B. IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY
Pursuing a regional strategy to support an expanded
Brazilian military role in the counter-drug campaign and
ensure the continuation of the democratic process in Brazil
is best accomplished by expanding current U.S. initiatives.
The U.S. military enjoys a unique and traditional
relationship with their Brazilian counterparts. During
World War II, a Brazilian Expeditionary Force fought under
the command of American General Mark Clark in the Italian
campaign. Following World War II, a military agreement was
signed by both countries and they enjoyed a relationship of
cooperation until 1977, when Brazil unilaterally severed the
agreement. This was due to U.S. criticism of Brazil's human
119 . .Good examples of this are the Brazilian apprehension over
the U.S. military presence in the Andean countries and the
radical responses to international environmental concerns over
the depletion of the Amazon rain forest.
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rights record and U.S. attempts to block Brazil's nuclear
power development program. However, high level contacts
between the two militaries occur annually. Brazil is the
only country in Latin America that conducts army-to-army
staff talks with the United States and a yearly seminar is
held to commemorate U.S. -Brazil cooperation during WWII.
Additionally, Brazilian forces participate in the annual
UNITAS exercise. UNITAS is a combined U.S. and Latin
American exercise that promotes interoperability among the
region's forces. It is primarily a naval exercise. There
is also a high level of personnel exchange between the two
countries. U.S. personnel attend Brazil's war college and
jungle survival school and Brazilian personnel attend
similar U.S. military schools.
These contacts could be utilized to illustrate to
Brazilian military officers the benefit and utility of
involving the military in counter-drug operations. Although
the U.S. military has no history of involving itself overtly
in national politics, it does share similar Brazilian
military experiences in enforcing internal order. For
example, U.S. military forces have been utilized in domestic
security operations in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957; in the
Watts riots of 1965; during disturbances in Washington, DC
120 Richard Nyrop, Brazil: A Country Study . 1983, 283.
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in 1971; and most recently in Los Angeles, California. It
could be beneficial to demonstrate to Brazilian officers how
the U.S. military, which is not fond of intervening in civil
affairs, has assisted the government in ensuring internal
order and maintained a high level of professionalism.
The continuation of combined exercises such as UNITAS
can assist in enhancing military professionalism. UNITAS
provides Brazilians with the opportunity to exercise their
conventional forces with the region's other major powers.
This is important because combined exercises allow
militaries to demonstrate their capabilities to one another.
The United States should avoid providing the Brazilian
military direct counter-drug assistance, such as equipment
that could be used for other military purposes. For example,
much of the U.S. military equipment supplied to the
Colombian armed forces is used to combat guerrilla forces
and not necessarily drug traffickers, indicating that the
Colombian military may have its own plans for U.S. counter-
drug assistance. Counter-drug operations are law
enforcement operations and the emphasis of U.S. aid should
continue to be on enhancing the capabilities of Brazil's
civilian law enforcement agencies. By continuing to assist
Brazilian law enforcement agencies, U.S. aid affords the
Brazilian government additional latitude in determining a
future role for the Brazilian military in counter-drug
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operations. U.S. policy toward Brazil should emphasize the
promotion and support of democratic principles and this
policy should guide counter-drug operations.
This study has demonstrated that internal and
institutional pressures will lead to greater Brazilian
involvement in counter-drug operations. With the existence
of these Brazilian pressures for greater military
involvement in counter-drug operations, U.S. objectives are
best accomplished by supporting democratic initiatives.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The introduction raised a number of questions that were
addressed throughout the thesis. These issues relate to (1)
the scope of the drug problem in Brazil; (2) the external,
internal and institutional pressures that are driving the
Brazilian military to assume a larger role in counter-drug
operations; (3) the proper role of the Brazilian military in
counter-drug operations; and (4) the role the United States
should play in a Brazilian counter-drug strategy. This
section will summarize the answers to these questions and
provide recommendations for further research.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The drug problem in Brazil is no longer limited to the
country's role as a transhipment route to drug markets in
the United States and Europe. Drug traffickers are
beginning to move their operations into Brazil and are
increasingly directing their illicit product at a growing
Brazilian consumer market. The consequence of the illegal
drug trade — corruption, violence, drug abuse — are
becoming more and more visible and Brazilian initiatives,
such as the congressional inquiry into the problem and the
proposed anti-drug law, indicate that Brazil's drug problem
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is becoming an issue of national importance. The problem is
rapidly becoming a threat to Brazil's national security and
additional resources are required to curtail its expansion.
In the long term, Brazil needs to develop a comprehensive
counter-drug strategy. Without the immediate dedication of
the resources required to defeat the drug traffickers,
Brazil could become another Colombia. The military could
provide this needed immediate response.
Due to the national security concerns of the United
States, external pressure from the United States was,
initially, the primary source of pressure for Brazilian
military involvement in counter-drug operations. With the
increasing severity of Brazil's drug problem and the
identity crisis faced by the military, internal factors are
pressing for greater military involvement in counter-drug
operations. The military's desire to remain an important
and professional institution indicates that in addition to
increasing their role in the counter-drug campaign, they may
accept changes and reductions in their force structures.
Although changes in the force structures and roles of the
Brazilian military represent a source of tension in civil-
military relations, it is also possible that these changes
could strengthen democratic rule and further professionalize
the military.
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The proper role of the Brazilian military in counter-
drug operations should be an expansion of its current role.
The military should provide increased communications,
intelligence, logistical and training support to Brazilian
law enforcement agencies, but should avoid direct
involvement in actual law enforcement operations.
Additionally, the military can greatly enhance air and
riverine interdiction efforts in the country's Amazon
region.
Control of the military forces in counter-drug
operations will be a critical issue to resolve. At the
strategic level, the multi-faceted requirements of anti-drug
operations dictate that military support should be
coordinated by a joint military staff subordinate to the
minister of justice. At the tactical level, joint
military/DPF operations will greatly increase the state's
ability to enforce anti-drug laws throughout Brazil.
However, these issues of control exacerbate historical
institutional animosities between the DPF and the military
and heighten the civil-military debate over creating a
single defense ministry.
Based on the transnational nature of illicit drug trade,
the United States should emphasize a regional counter-drug
strategy. In the case of Brazil, this translates into
respecting its sovereignty and supporting and strengthening
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Brazilian counter-drug initiatives. The civil-military
implications associated with a greater Brazilian military
role in counter-drug operations and the U.S. strategic
objective of promoting democracy indicate that the United
States should support democratic initiatives in Brazil.
Specifically, the United States should use military-to-
military contacts to illustrate the institutional and
national benefits of an expanded counter-drug role. The
United States should also support civilian control of
government by providing assistance to strengthen traditional
law enforcement capabilities.
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis has demonstrated that internal and
institutional forces will lead to greater Brazilian military
involvement in the counter-drug campaign. However, a number
of issues require further research. First, there is a need
to determine if there is support within the military for an
expanded counter-drug role. There are some indications that
differences exist between military officers stationed in the
Amazon, who support an expanded role, and officers in the
high command, located in the cities, who are less
supportive.
Second, the issue of who would control Brazilian
military units involved in counter-drug operations needs to
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be more thoroughly examined. The debate concerning the
creation of a defense ministry could provide some insight
into how much authority the military is willing to concede
to civilians.
Finally, a more comprehensive study of how Brazil would
fit into a regional counter-drug strategy is needed. For
example, what is the likelihood of the Amazon Pact
signatories agreeing to a combined counter-drug campaign in
the Amazon Basin, including coordinated riverine operations
and a cooperative air interdiction effort? These and
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